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1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the remedy provided in a con-
sent decree entered in a Title VII action between an association 
of minority firefighters and the City on the grounds that the 
re~dy exceeds the statutory restrictions on judicial relief 
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1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the remedy provided in a con-
sent decree entered in a Title VII action bet~en an association 
of minority firefighters and the City on the grounds that the 
remedy exceeds the statutory restrictions on judicial relief -





2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: The Vanguards of Cleveland, 
an association of black and hispanic firefighters ern~loyed by the 
City, brought a class action alleging, inter al i a, that the City 
discriminated against minorities with regard to promotion prac-
tices in the fire department. 
The City and the vanguards then began to negotiate a settle-
men t. During these negotiations, the d ist. ct. (ND Ohio, J. 
Lambros) granted petr's motion to intervene. Five months later, 
the vanguards filed a proposed consent decree with the court. 
The court held evidentiary hearings to consider petr's objections 
to the decree and urged the parties to negotiate further. The 
Vanguards ultimately submitted another consent decree negotiated 
between themselves and the City. Petr's elected leadership orig-
inally approved the decree, but the membership refused to accept 
the ag reem en t. 
The decree contained both an admission by the City that 
there had been a history of discrimination in the fire depart-
ment's hiring and promotion practices, and an affirmative action 
plan to remedy the effects of those practices. Under the plan, 
(to last through 1987), all minority firefighters who passed a 
.._ /I \\ 
1981 promotional examination are tequired to be promoted to the 
- -----
next higher rank. The promotions are to be made on the basis of 
one non-minority to one minority appointee, based on the relative -
eligible list rankj_ng of the individuals. 
tions were ordered for the next two years, and from the elig1bil-
ity lists compiled from these test results, the City is required 




The dist. ct. adopted the proposed consent pecree. The 
court found "a historical pattern of racial discr·i1mination in ---promotions" in the City's fire department, and ruled that the 
decree 's affirmative ac tion plan wa s not an unreasonable remedy 
in light of this determination. 





related to the obi_.ectiv_: i remedying prior ~crimi­
"fair and reasonable to non-minorities who may be 
it." Op., AlO. The court noted that the plan estab-
lishes only "relatively modest goals," does not require the City 
either to hire unqualified minority firefighters or to discharge -- --
any non-minority firefighters and is of short duration; an ind i -
cation of its remedial nature. Id. at All. 
The court also found that Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 
v. Stotts, 104 s.ct. 2576 (1984) had no effect on this case. The 
court distinguished Stotts on two grounds. First, the plan in 
Stotts abrogated a valid seniority system to the detriment of 
non-minority workers. Here, the consent decree expressly main-
tains the benefits of seniority and does not interfere with se-
nior i ty rights. More importantly, the court in Stotts ordered 
the City to ignore its seniority system; an order found to be 
impermissible. Here, the City agreed to the plan adopted by the 
court. This is crucial because the relevant sections of Title 
VII merely limit the court's power to award certain relief; they 
do not make any conduct illegal. "[Title VII] does not for bid an 
employer from engaging in certain actions but rather limits what 
an employer may be forced to do." rd. at Al6. 
-4-
Finally, although recognizing that the Court had been "some-
what ambiguous on this point," the CA6 
:1 
found no thing in Stotts 
to forbid a consent decree from providing remedies in excess of 
those that could be ordered by a court in a purely coercive ac-
tion under 'T"itle VII. To read Stotts otherwise would amount to 
a sub silento overruling of United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 443 u.s. 193 (1979) which permitted an employer voluntari-
ly to adopt a reasonable plan to increase minority employment, 
even at the expense of non-minority seniority rights. 
J. Kennedy dissented. She noted that the premise of Stotts 
was that Title VII does not empower a court to order relief based 
on mere membership in the dis advantaged class; relief is to be 
limited only to those who have been the actual victims of illegal r 
discrimination. The consent decree in the present case, however, 
provides relief to many firefighters who have not been victims of 
past discrimination. Given that a consent decree is an order of 
the court and not a purely voluntary action, the dist. ct. here 
exceeded the limits of its remedial powers in exactly the same 
fashion as the lower court in Stotts. This incongruity bet~en 
the relief granted pursuant to a consent decree and that avail-
able in a coercive action is not supported by Stotts or by the 
language and legislative history of Title VII. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the dist. ct.'s remedy is 
inconsistent with both Title VII and Stotts. Stotts makes clear 
that under Title VII, a court may only order relief for those 
individuals who have been actual victims of past discrimination. 





tion," avoided this limitation, and approved relief that benefits 
minorities based solely on their membership in the 4 isadvantaged 
class. A consent judgment is not purely voluntary action, as the 
court enters an order and retains jurisdiction _in order to ensure --
compliance. Moreover, even if the case does involve only volun-
tary action, Title VII still limits an employer's ability to pro-
mote minorities at the expense of non-minority employees. 
Resp City argues that the CA6's distinction bet~en coercive 
orders and consent decrees is consistent with Stotts. Resp Van-
guards argues that the City's adoption of the plan was a corn-
pletely voluntary action, and as such, is consistent with Weber. 
Even if the plan is r;g_t volun~y action, however, the relief 
ordered by the dist. ct., to-date, has only benefited minority 
employees who actually have been victims of discrimination; 
Sto t.ts has rot been violated. 
The United States as amicus curaie urges the Court to grant 
cert in order to clarify the meaning of Stotts. Stotts stands 
for the proposition that a court in a Title VII action may not 
award af f irrnat i ve relief to no n-v ict i rns at the expense of in no-
cent third parties. Too many CA's are avoiding Stotts, however, 
by holding that it only applies when seniority rights are 
abridged, or by finding that it does not apply to consent de-
c rees. Both d ist i net ions are improper, and the Court must ex-
plain this in order to prevent future improper rulings. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case essentially involves one ques-
tion: whether the remedy provided in a Title VII consent decree 
must conform to the restrictions on judicial relief otherwise 
-b-
. ' 
applicable in Title VII cases? The issue is impor,tant, but is 
not cert worthy at this time. 
Stotts provides the origins of the debate over this issue. 
The question there was "whether the district court exceeded its 
powers in entering an injunction requiring white employees to be 
laid off, when the otherwise applicable seniority system would 
have called for the layoff of black employees with less senior-
ity." 104 s.ct. at 2585 (footnotes omitted). The court rejected 
each of the CA's rationales for upholding the injunction, and 
held that the district court had exceeded its powers. 
The CA held that such an injunction was proper because it 
did no more than enforce the terms of a consent decree. In re-
jecting this analysis, the Court stated that the "scope of a con-
/ 
sent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by 
reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the par-
ties to it or by what might have been written had the plaintiff 
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation." 
Id. at 2586 (citations omitted). Because the consent decree made 
no mention of layoffs or demotions, the Court concluded that the 
express terms of the decree itself negated theCA's reliance on 
this "specific performance" approach 
'!he CA also held that the injunction was proper as a means 
to effectuate the strong policy favoring voluntary settlement of 
Title VII actions. The CA reasoned that "[ i] t would be incongru-
ous to hold that the use of the preferred means of resolving an 
employment discrimination action decreases the power of a court 
to order relief which vindicates the policies embodied within 
-7-
Title VII .... " 104 s.ct. at 2588. The Court dismissed this ra-
tionale because it "overstate[d) the authority of th ,i trial court 
' 
r to] impose [] as an adjunct of settlement something that 
could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and the 
plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination 
existed." Id. 
In dissent, Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall) disagreed with this portion of the majority's opinion: 
The Court's analysis seems to be premised on 
the view that a consent decree cannot provide 
relief that could not be obtained at trial. • •• I 
do not mean imply that I accept this premise as 
correct. This Court has explained that Con-
gress intended to encourage voluntary settlement 
of Title VII suits, and cooperative private ef-
forts to eliminate the lingering effects of past 
discrimination. It is by no means clear, there-
fore, that the permissible scope of relief avail-
able under a consent decree is the same as could 
be ordered by a court after a finding of liabil-
ity at trial. 
104 s.ct. at 2605 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted) • 
Similarly, ,Justice Stevens in his coocurring opinion noted: 
The Court seems to suggest that a consent de-
cree cannot authorize anything that would not 
constitute permissible relief under Title VII. I 
share Justice Blackmun 's doubts as to whether 
this is the correct test •.•. The Court itself 
acknowledges that the administration of if a con-
sent decree must be tested by the four corners of 
the decree, and not by the what might have been 
ordered had respondents prevailed on the merits, 
which makes its subsequent discussion of Title 
VII all the more puzzling. 
Id. at 2594-2595 n.3 (Stevens, J. coocurring) (citations omitted). 
In response to these comments, the majority replied: 
-o-
The dissent seems to suggest, and Justic~ Stevens ex-
pre ssly states, that 'l'itle VII is irrelevant in determin-
ing whether the District Court acted properl/1y in modify-
ing the consent decree. However, •.• ~he District 
Court's authority to impose a modification of a decree is 
not wholly dependent on the decree. '[T]he District 
Court's author ity to adopt a consent comes only from th e 
statute which the decree is in tended to enforce, ' not 
from the parties' consent to the decree .... [A] district 
court cannot enter a disputed modification of a consent 
decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting order is 
inconsistent with that statute. · 
rd. at 2587 n.9 (citations omitted). 
Stotts dealt with the power of a court to modify a consent 
judg~ over th~ion C:,f o; e of parties. It is thus un-
clear whether Stotts also requires that adoption of a consent 
decree in a Title VII action be limited by the remedies available 
under that statute. Such a reading of Stotts would put that case 
( in conflict with Weber, where the Court ruled that Title VII does 
not forbid private employers from voluntarily entering into af-
firmative action plans to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in 
employment categories. For this reason, all of the CA's that 
have addressed this issue, including the CA6 in the present case, 
have held that Stotts does not apply to consent decrees. See 
Deveraux v. Geary, No. 83-1345 at 17-18 (CAl June 24, 1985); 
TUrner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 824-825 (CAll 1985); EEOC v. Local 
6 3 8 , 7 5 3 F . 2 d 11 7 2 , 11 8 5-8 6 ( CA 2 19 8 5) . 
The question presented in this case is important and needs 
to be addressed. Moreover, the case provides the court with an 
opportunity to resolve in the Title VII context the same question 
thay it has chosen to answer under the the fourtePnth amendment 
in Wygant v. Jackson School Board, 746 F.2d 1152 (CA6), cert. 
'---.... granted, No. 84-1340 (April 15, 1984). These reasons support the 
-9-
·r Court's granting cert in this case. On the other hand, however, 
given that the Court decided Stotts I so recently and ,,j that all of 0G 
the CA's faced with the question have uniformly interpreted the 
decision in the same manner, I see no reason for the Court to 
grant cert at this time. Should a conflict develop between the 
circuits, the Court can then step in both to resolve the dispute 
and to further explain its decision in Stotts. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response and an amicus brief filed by the 
United States. 
August 19, 1985 Schultz Opin in petn. 
j' 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
~ To: Mr. Justice Powell February 21, 1986 
From: Bob 
No. 84-1999 
LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, 
AFL-CIO, C. L. C. v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al, and VANGUARDS OF 
CLEVELAND 
Cert to CA6, set for argument Tuesday, February 25, 1986 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Whether a judgment entered with the consent of a defendant 
public employer in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 may award racial preferences in promotions to 
persons who are not actual victims of the employer's discrimina-
"--..... t ion. 
'• I 
.. 
"'· 7 • 
'· ,·; 




of an intervenor of right whose interests are adversel0 affected 
by the terms of the consent judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Vanguards of Cleveland, an association of black and his-
panic firefighters employed by the City, brought a class action 
alleging, inter alia, that the City discriminated against minor-
ities with regard to promotion practices in the fire department. 
The City and the Vanguards then began to negotiate a settle-
ment. During these negotiations, the district court (ND Ohio, J. 
Lambros) granted petr' s motion ~ve~ Five months later, 
..... ~·· oe::.::::..----·-·· 
the Vanguards filed a proposed consent decree with the court. 
The court held evidentiary hearings to consider petr's objections 
\____.,., to the decree and urged the parties to negotiate further. The 
'--- ·-
Vanguards ultimately submitted another consent decree negotiated 
between themselves and the City. Petr's elected leadership orig-
Y/~ 
inally approved the decree, but the membership~ refused to accept 
the agreement. 
The decree contained both ~n admission by the City that --
there had been a history of discrimination in the fire depart-
ment's hiring and promotion practices, ~d an affirmative action 
plan to remedy the effects of those practices. Under the plan, 
(to last through 1987) , all minority f i ref igh ter s who passed a 
1981 promotional examination are "required" to be promoted to the 
next higher rank. The promotions are to be made on the basis of 
one non-minority to one minority appointee, based on the relative I k I 
eligible list ranking of the individuals. Additional exam ina-
tions were ordered for the next two years, anq from the ' eligibil-
il 
i ty lists compiled from these test results, the City ' ~greed to 
promote certain percentages of minorities. 
The district court adopted the proposed consent decree. The 
court found "a historical pattern of racial discrimination in 
promotions" in the City's fire department, and ruled that the 
decree's affirmative action plan was not an unreasonable remedy 
in light of this determination. 
/ 
The CA6 affirmed. The majority found the plan to be both 
"reasonably related to the objective of remedying prior discrimi-
nation" and "fair and reasonable to non-minorities who may be 
affected by it." Op., AlO. The court noted that the plan estab-




either to hire unqualified minority firefighters or to d~rge ~r . 




---- ~cation of its remedial nature. Id. at All. 
II. DISCUSSION. 
~ 
You may feel that the issue of the scope of relief permitted ~/~ 
~~ by §706(g) is foreclosed by Stotts' references to §706(g) as sug- U
gesting that only make-whole relief to victims is permitted by 
§706 (g). Stotts did say that the view that a court can award 
competitive seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has 
actually been a victim of illegal discrimination is consistent 
with the policy behind §706 (g). But~ did not ~ that 
such a ruling was required by §706(g), which is the position that 
-----------------------
the SG takes here. Further it is not absolutely clear that Stotts 




fered with a bona fide seniority plan under § 70 3 (h) . 
il 
have considere anew the §706 (g) issue. Finally, I db 
Thus, ....L ')~ 
~Ad-
not be-  
lieve that the SG ever makes clear the relationship between his 
concept of "victim specificity" and preferential relief. I think 
that the SG's position could be read even to preclude the use of 
flexible goals in hiring, promotion, etc, f 
. s~ . 
because o h1s ~ 1ns1st- SG-5' 
~ 
ence on a remedy being tied only to specific victims, and the "1~ ~ 
need for a remedy to go no further than needed to remedy actual ~~ 
--~IAA-4/ 
d iscr imina tion. A goal, for example, could be construed to be ~ or:•· '-'""! 
"preferential relief." Thus, my discussion of the SG' s position ~ ~ 
k>~ 
centers around the concept of goals. I later discuss how this v-z..c..~ 
case should be resolved given your views on quotas. 
A. Title VII 
Section 706(g), and particularly that provision's last sen- f 7tJ "&') - L.-&.- ~'1-
~L,.,-
tence, is at the center of the dispute in this case and in Local 
28, No. 84-1656. It provides in pertinent part: 
If the court finds that the respondent has inten-
tionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an 
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, 
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in 
such unlawful employment practice, and order such af-
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may ~ in­
cluae, but 1s n 1 1 e to·, reinstatement or hiring 
of employees, with or without back pay ... ,or any oth-
er equitable relief as the court deems appropriate .... 
No order of the court shall require the admission or 
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, 
or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an indi-
vidual as an employee, or the payment to him of any 
back pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or 
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any rea-
son other than discrimination on account of race, col-
or, religion, sex, or national origin in violation of 
§2000-3(a) of this title. 
tPf~ 
k ,4----L • 
Any discussion of this case must begin ~ith the plain lan-
guage above. The SG takes the position that the 
I S 6- ~ underf~ ned lan-
guage above makes clear Congress' intent in 1964 to disallow any 
remedies that are not victim specific. 
the last sentence of §706(g) does not support a reading that all 
meaning of the last sentence in effect reads "No court shall 
order the reinstatement, etc. of someone who was not discriminat-
ed against." Respondents argue that a plain reading of the sen-
tence supports a view that "No court shall order the reinstate-
ment, etc. of someone who was fired for a reason other than dis-
crimination." While both meanings can be derived from the words 
~ of the sentence, the SG fails to deal with a well-taken point of 
respondents, that the sentence cannot possibly be meant to ad-
dress prospective remedies, because it speaks only of orders con-
cerning an individual who was "refused admission, etc." Thus, in 
cases where liability is not based solely on discrimination 
against named individuals, as in a case brought by an individual, 
~mL1-
but F-iitl:u;u;. based on a pattern or practice of discrimination, 
A 
against a whole class of individuals, this sentence bars a court 
order only with respect to someone "refused admission," but does ---....-. ,, 
not speak to ~quitable relief that can go to other members of the 
class. A fair response is that Congress must have assumed that -
only those refused admission could benefit from an injunction, 
but that is clearly not so. An injunction as in Local 28, order-
ing a union to stop its discriminatory practices benefits all 
~o.d..·~..Jj 
I 1~ minorities who were not rejected but who in the future may want 
il 




is bolstered by the remarks of ~ 
at l'7tJ(,(_1) 
-Respondents' literal reading 
Representative Celler who offered the amendment adding the last ~
sentence to §706(g): 
"Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the Amendment is to 
specify cause. Here the court, for example, cannot 
find any violation of the Act which is based on facts 
other--and I emphasize "other"--than discrimination on 
the grounds of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin. The discharge might be based for example, on in-
com~ekence or-a morals charge or theft, but the court 
can o n ider charges based on race, color, rel i-
gion~rlgln. TFiat 18 tile --pfl"r15bse or this 
amendment.·' Il~ Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964). 
For the sake of brevity, I have eliminated a several page 
\.._.....- discussion of the legislative history of the 1964 Act and the 
1972 Amendments, and will simply state my conclusions as to how 
/1~ < 
they bear on a statutory construction analysis. I --1 thinl<-t the J4..e 
statutory construction question is, in the end, a very close/1..-~ ?-_~ 
call, yet I am left unconvinced by the SG' s argument that Con-~ ---
gress clearly intended all relief to be victim specific in all~ ~ 
e!~ 
cases. The references and fights over quotas, do not in all in- ~~~ 
stances address the precise issue of whether relief must in all 
cases be victim specific. In addition, it is also clear that the 
1964 complaints centered largely around a fear that racial imbal-
ance per se would constitute a violation of Title VII. I am un-
comfortable hinging a contrary holding on admittedly broad state-
ments of the proponents, that are only awkwardly supported by the 
~ plain words of the statute. In addition, the Ervin amendment and 
I 
the fact that a few courts were upholding goa+s prior to 1972 cut 
marginally in favor of respondents. 
Added to all this, is the fact that the CA's and the govern-
--------------------------~ 
ment itself apparently held the view that these numerical goals 
were permissible for quite a long time .1 Indeed, amicus NAACP 
li do not think respondents are correct that all courts of ~ 
appeals have so held. I do not think the case they cite for the ,~- ·--~ 
proposition from the CAlO supports their point. I have broken , 
down somewhat the court of appeals cases relied on by respondents ~~ vf 
to determine the precise nature of the issue before the court, ~~­
because in some cases that involve goals it is difficult to tell ~~ 
whether others who were not victims benefited. At least two 
circuits have rejected the argument relative to 706(g) advanced 
here. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1557 (CAS 
1984) (en bane) ("at this point in the history of the fight 
against discrimination, it cannot be seriously argued that there 
is any insurmountable barrier to the use of goals or quotas to 
eradicate the effects of past discrimination"); EEOC v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 556 F.2d 167 (CA3 1977), 
cert. denied, 438 u.s. 915 (1978). Other cases have clearly 
provided goals relief to those who were non-victims. United 
States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (CA7 1977) (suit brought 
under §§1981, 1983, 1985, Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VII; 
relief justified under broad remedial powers of Title VII); Davis 
v. City of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (CA9 1977) (rejecting 
argument based on 703(j), and noting that decree also based on 
§1981), vacated as moot, 440 u.s. 625 (1970). Rios v. Enterprise 
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 501 F.2d 622 (CA2 1974) 
(goals challenged expressly under §703(j)); Boston Chapter NAACP 
v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (CAl 1974) (rejecting argument advanced 
under §703(j)); United States v. Masonry Contractors Association 
of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (CA6 1974) (Title VII case); 
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (CA8 1971) (case brought under 
§1981, but analogizing to remedies proper under Title VII and 
rejecting claim that presence of identified persons who have been 
discriminated against is a necessary prerequisite to the 
establishment of goals), cert. denied, 406 u.s. 950 (1972). In 
other cases, usually promotion cases, brought by those already in 
a company or agency alleged to be discriminating, it is arguable 
whether the beneficiaries of the goal were "victims" or not; 
although it is clear that the cases did not require any showing 
that each beneficiary of the goal could be considered a victim. 
Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (CAll 1985), cert. filed No. 
85-999 (case brought under §§ 1981, 1983 and Fourteenth 
Amendment, but court discussed impact of Stott's title VII 
holding; probably a hold for 84-1999); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 
(Footnote continued) 
legal defense fund in 84-1999 does a convincing 




by t 'He Govern-
ment to show how victim specific relief can be awarded, them-
selves contain racial preferences. I do not think the assumption 
of the CA 1 s that such goals are permissible, and in some cases 
their square rejection of an opposite view, should be lightly 
overlooked by this Court, especially in light of the fact that 
the SG here is asking for a rather remarkable reformation of ex-
isting law concerning Title VII remedies. 
Such remedial remedies when properly applied are in no way · 
inconsistent with Congress 1 ..,__, __ _ enactment of Title VII ~ "to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those dis-
crimina tory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
~ stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citi-
zens." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 499 
!,../ 
(POWELL, J., 
concurring). On a more practical level, as Amici Lawyers Commit-
tee point out, the use of such remedial devices may in fact be 
the only effective way in certain cases to efficiently combat 
blatant discrimination. The facts of the Local 28 case where the 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
F.2d 257 (CADC 1982) (Title VII): Chisolm v. United States Postal 
Service, 665 F.2d 482 (CA4 1981) (action brought under Fifth 
Amendment, §1981 and Title VII: goal relief sustained under broad 
remedial powers of Title VII). Clearly the weight of authority is 
that such relief is permitted, although, as noted few of the 
cases specifically discuss statutory challenges based on Title 
VII. I have not looked to determine in each of the above whether 
these goals were perhaps in reality quotas, but I think it is 
fair to say that in a good number they would be difficult to 
distinguish from the remedies at bar. 
SG describes petitioner's conduct as "contumacious,h perhaps 
il 
present as stark a case as any that other uses of equitable power 




In addition, such prospective relief relieves both par- ~ 
potentially costly battles over who were the actual vic-
a particular practice. Such battles inevitably would 
involve issues not easily susceptible to proof. The very battle 
in the briefs in this case over whether those who would benefit 
from promotions are victims or not, is to the point. See also 
EEOC v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 556 F.2d 167, 175 
(CA3 1977), cert. denied, 438 u.s. 915 (1978) (discussing scope 
of concept of "victim"). To uphold the use of such remedies does 
not require their use in all cases; it does not, for example, 
~ exempt state entities such as those in this case from consti tu-
tional constraints; and DC's are subject to review in theCA's. A 
decision that they are within the meaning of Title VII merely 
means that a court may resort to them--not that it must. Because 
the SG is arguing that relief in all cases must be victim specif-
ic, I do not read this case--at the statutory level--as one in 
which that distinction could be applied. 
A perhaps more sound reading of the legislative history sup-
ports a view--very different, I think, from the one advanced by 
the SG--that Congress wa: c~~abo~t fquota~ a~~hey 
are beyond the scope of Title VII. This I believe comports with 
your view, initially expressed in Bakke, that mandatory quotas 
are unconstitutional. A holding that Title VII does not permit 
fixed quotas could stern reasonably either f ,rorn the legislative 
il 
history or from the Constitution. ''\ 
The critical issue, in this case, then would turn on whether 
this case involves a goal or a quota. It is difficult to find in 
the plan approved here the requisite flexibility that the word 
"goal" suggests. The mere fact that the DC is able to modify the 
decree, upon request, does not change the fact that at any given 
moment a fixed requirement is in place. It is true, on the other 
hand, that the plan is set to terminate at some point. Perhaps 
one way to distinguish goals and quotas is to consider whether 
the employer has agreed to any behavior to enable him to reach a 
-----------------------goal beyond the mere agreement to try to put X number of minor-
ities into a given position. Thus, for example, a flexible pro-...___-......_ ___ --.. 
\...._.., motion goal of 20% lieutenants might more resemble a "goal" if 
the decree requires certain steps to attain it, such as training 
programs (open to all), special help classes, etc. The plan here 
seems simply to require race-conscious promoting, which arguably 
makes it seem more like a quota than a goal. I think, however, 
Ti.V-t} 
that squarely finding that the plan here is a quota faces ~o t:Tt-r..~ 
obstacles. First, respondents argue that in fact all of those 1-c ~ -- ~....:.-.. 
entitled to promotion are indeed victims of past discrimination. ~·~ 
~Th~re is a fight about this in the briefs and I am not certain -
~~t this Court would want to resolve that. On remand, respond-
• ~ ... e.~l}trLt s' would be free to argue that the quotas here benefited only 
- J Y. r 4 bL-: 
~~yPvi&tirns--although this raises a difficult issue in the context of 
vAI"'t....JVtn . 
~ unlitigated consent decrees. ( SeconJ , respondents assert, and it 
does not appear to be rebutted, that in order to carry out the 
plan the city enlarged the total number of , supervisors in the 
--) ~ 
department, so that the number of non-minorities who ''\ would be 
.-::---
denied a ·on at a e might arguabl~be_as li~e as 
three or four. ------- This simply adds a wrinkle when one thinks of 
quotas as hurting qualified whites. It may be worth asking petr 
about this at oral argument. In the end, because this does not 
have the flexibility that you think goals ought to have, it is 
fair to call this a quota. 
B. The Consent Decree Issue 
Whether you agree or disagree that Title VI I does not bar 
the type of relief in this case, you will still have to consider 
problems raised by the fact that the order here was entered pur-
--------------------~-------
suant to a consent decree. If you agree that Title VII does not 
~ bar the type of relief here, I think that the intervention of the 
union does not give it a veto power over the settlement. It has ~ -
not agreed to do anything, and therefore is not "bound" by the 
consent decree. The SG contends, in effect, however, that the 
union should have a veto power of any settlement here. This ar- ~ ~ 
~~ 
gument is apparently premised on the SG's assertion that the set- ~~ 
tlement agreement here interfered with collective bargaining ~ 
~ 
rights under a contract and under statutory law. Of course, that ~ 
was not raised in the court below, and respondent City of Cleve-
land contends that the issue was never presented by the union, 
but only by the SG on petition for rehearing below. The SG does 
not rebut this. In addition, the collective bargaining agreement 
is not in the record. Nor is it clear that the Memorandum does 
what the SG says it does. Similarly, the SG's argument with re-
. '~ 
I 
spect to seniority rights seems forced and a~ attempt to stretch 
I 
this case into one resembling Stotts. Absent any particular 
legal right of the union which has been impinged, I think the 
argument that the union had a veto power over a consent decree 
here loses considerable support in logic and in the cases cited 
by the SG for the proposition. In addition, it should be clear 
that permitting a veto in all cases to those who are allowed to 
represent non-minorities and who intervene in actions would make 
settlement of Title VII cases impossible, even in cases that do 
not call for goals and race-conscious relief, as there would be 
no particular reason to limit such a rule to such cases. Final-
ly, it is not so anomalous to permit an interested party merely 
to voice concerns rather than have a veto. In a class 
settlement to be approved by a district judge, objectors do not ~ 
action ~~~ 
-----
have a veto, merely a say. The few CAS cases relied on by ---. the SG 
do not state a contrary rule: rather, they recognize that a union 
has a stronger right of objection when its collective bargaining 
rights are being interfered with. E.g., E.E.O.C. v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d S67 (CAS 1983). But cf. Wheeler v. Ameri-
can Horne Products Corp., S82 F.2d 891 (CAS 1978). This is not 
to say that objectors' complaints are to be ignored: indeed here 
the CA noted that the DC permitted intervention, held two eviden-
tiary hearings to consider intervenor's objections, as well as 
~ 
solicited written objections, and encouraged negotiation to in-
elude the intervenor. 
2. Distinguishing Voluntary and Court Ordered Plan 
If you believe that the use of "qu~as" , is beyond 
1 
the scope 
{. c './J ~) il 
of Title VII because the constitution equires such a ' k onstruc-
tion of the statute, then I agree that the Court was without au-
thority because the ultimate decree clearly violated the consti-
tution.2 If, on the other hand, you believe that Title VII, ir-
respective of constitutional concerns, bars all forms of victim 
specific relief, then I believe that a consent decree embodying 
goals or other race-conscious relief would still be proper. 
Whatever the basis for a decision that Title VII might deny such 
victim specific relief, Congress' concerns are not present when a 
court is not forcing relief on a party. Consent vitiates the con-
cern about coerced remedies. The presence of the union in this 
case does not alter the analysis; their consent would be required 
~ were they to be bound by any result. They are, however, not bound 
by the consent decree in the sense that they are required to un-
dertake any particular activity or forbear from any conduct. 
This does not ignore the union's interest which justified inter-
vention because they are still free to object to the DC and on 
appeal to aspects of the consent decree that infringe their in-
terests. The consent decree thus would be in val ida ted only if 
some substantive right of the non-minorities either under Title 
2Arguably, there is no constitutional issue square!z presented ~~t 
by~ questions presented. Below "'I r~petr r-s argument that 7 
merely because the decree is beyond the scope of Title VII it is 
invalid. To find this remedy a constitutional violation, then, 
goes beyond the scope of the question presented. In light of a I 
view that Title VII should be construed to be in accord with the 
constitution, it would be silly not to address the issue here. 
, •• 1" 
' 
VII or the constitution were being violated. , Because ' this case 
II 
probably concerns a quota, it will be unnecessary to co~sider the 
constitutional issue of whether a goal permissible under Title 
VII will always be permissible under the constitution. In addi-
tion, the SG's view that Title VII consent decrees including any 
kind of race-conscious relief are beyond the scope of the statute 
ignores the practical problem that such a holding would not simi-
larly curtail remedies available under 42 u.s.c. §1981, and di-
rectly under the Fourteenth Amendment. It may be unwise to force 
litigants to use these avenues by taking away means of effective 
relief under Title VII. Thus, were you to conclude that the rem-
edies in these two cases were goals, but that even these goals 
were beyond the scope of Title VII, I think that the decisions 
~ below could be affirmed because the order was embodied in a con-
sent decree. There is, of course, contrary language in Stotts at 
n.9. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Your position with respect to quotas arguably requires a 
statutory construction of Title VII that avoids this constitu- 7 ? 
tional flaw. Such an approach leaves to courts and parties by 
consent the use of flexible, temporary goals. The task of the 
Court, were it to adopt such a view would be to begin the process 
of clearly defining the difference between the two. 
rbs 02/21/86 ~ "2-)~ 3 . h)~ ~ )I-~u~ ~ 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell February 21, 1986 
From: Bob 
No.84-1656 
LOCAL 28 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION, LOCAL 28 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, v. EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al. (No. 84-1656) 
Cert to CA2, set for argument Tuesday, February 25, 1986 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED. 
a... 
(1) After general finding of discrimination against uniden-
1\ 
tified persons, may district court order race-conscious affirma-
tive action program with percentage "goal"? (2) Does reverse 
discrimination violate Equal Protection Clause or constitutional 
page l. 
I 
prohibition against Corruption of Blood? (3~ Should c ,ivil con-
'1 
tempt remedies be declared illegal criminal contemp~ 1 remedies 
imposed without due process when they include (a) compensatory 
component without proof of damages and (b) coercive component 
unrelated to contempt and without opportunity to purge contempt? 
(4) Do findings of discrimination, premised upon improper stand-
ards and statistics, followed by findings of contempt of result-
ing orders also based upon improper standards and statistics de-
pr ive union of due process? (5) Does district court order ap-
pointing administrator, with day-to-day supervisory powers over 
internal affairs of labor union, violate union's right to self-







a un1on of sheet metal workers in the New York 
an~ts committee responsible for its~a~ren­__...____...,. 
A majority of the union's members have tradi-
tionally come up through the apprenticeship program, a four-year 
course designed to teach sheet metal skills. A student entering 
the program is indentured, and upon graduation becomes a journey-
man. 
This case began in 1971 when the United States filed a Title 
VII suit against petrs to enjoin their pattern and practice of 
discriminating against nonwhites in union membership. The dis-
tr ict court found that petrs had purposefully denied nonwhites 
membership in the union in violation of Title VII. 
~ 
Petrs had · 
I 
accomplished this goal primarily by blocking the entr~ of non-
~~ 
whites into the apprenticeship program through the use d f invalid 
entrance exams, a requirement that applicants possess a high 
school diploma, and inquiries into applicants' arrest records. 
The district court entered judgment and created an affirmative 
action program (AAP) as a remedy. The petrs were ordered, among 
other things, to achieve a nonwhite membership "goal" of 29% by A~P --July 1, 1981, with interim percentage goals also set. The court 
appointed a special master called an "administrator" to supervise 
compliance with the AAP. 
The CA2 initially affirmed the finding of a Title VII viola-
tion, but reversed part of the relief granted. On remand, the 
district court entered a revised affirmative action program 
\....__...; (RAAP) that, inter ali a, retained the elements previously men-
tioned. A divided CA2 affirmed. ~1-!f£0{. _7 
/ 
In April 1982, the city and state of New York moved to have 
petrs held in contempt for failing to reach the RAAP's 29% goal. 
The district court granted the motion, but rather than base its 
contempt order directly on failure to meet the goal, it based the 
order on (l) underutilization of the apprenticeship program, (2) 
refusal to conduct an adequate publicity campaign, (3) adoption 
of a job protection plan that favored older, and hence white, 
members, (4) issuance of unauthorized work permits to whites from 
sister unions, and (5) failure to maintain and submit records and 
reports. The court determined that these violations of the RAAP 
thwarted the achievement of the goal. The court imposed a fine 
of $150,000 to be placed in a training fund to increase nonwhite 
page 4. 
I 
membership in the union's apprenticeship program and o~dered the 
I 
administrator to develop a plan for use of the fund. 
,., 
In April 1983, New York City again instituted contempt pro-
this time before the RAAP' s administra-
tor. The administrator concluded that petrs were in contempt of 
outstanding court orders requiring them to provide records of the 
race and national origin of all applicants for union membership. 
As a remedy, the pay for com-
puterized record keeping and make further payments to the train-
ing fund that the administrator was developing. The district 
court adopted the administrator's recommendations, but deferred 
setting an amount for the training fund contribution until the 
administrator submitted his proposal outlining a plan for the 
fund. In September 1983, the administrator submitted his pro-
posed plan, stating that the fund would be used to encourage non-
white membership in the union and be financed by the previous 
fines and a $.02 per hour labor tax on union members. The dis-
trict court issued a contempt order adopting the administrator's 
proposal. 
The district court issued still another contempt order in 
September 1983, this time adopting an amended affirmative action 
program (AAAP) that ( 1) increased the nonwhite membership goal 
from 29% to 29.23% to be reached by July 31, 1987, (2) estab-
1 ished an apprentice to journeyman ratio of 1: 4, ( 3) created a 
three-member apprentice selection board, ( 4) imposed a nonwhite 
to white ratio of 1:1 for admittance into the apprenticeship pro-
gram, ( 5) permitted work on new selection procedures to be used 
after the goal was reached, and (6) incorpot;ated the 'order re-
il 
quiring petrs to pay the costs of an advisor to rnonitoi1 the corn-
puterization of the records. 
The~A2 affirmed in most respects, and held that the AAAPO 
did not violate Title VII or the Constitution. For our purposes 
here, it is sufficient to note that the court ruled that the 
29.23% nonwhite membership objective was not a permanent quota 
but a temporary "permissible" goal. The goals would not unneces-
sar ily trammel the rights of innocent nonrninor i ties. The CA2, 
did, however, find that the DC had abused its discretion by re-
quiring the selection of one non-white for very white who enters 
the apprenticeship program. Judge Winter dissented. 
II. DISCUSSION. 
Local 28 is at this time attempting to raise every issue ~ 
about which it has ever disagreed in this litigation, notwi th- "f ~ 
standing consideration of those issues by the CA2 in earlier de- J1~~ 
~1-k 
cisions, and its failure to even seek certiorari of those deci-
r')'-~ 
sions. Thus, one task for the Court in this context is to deter-~
mine precisely which issues it is willing to decide. I agree with ~ 
the SG and the respondents that several issues that petrs attemp~ 
to raise in Local 28 should not now be addressed by this Court, t'2<...L~ 
in any event, if the Court were to address them, I agree that~ 
several of the contentions have no merit. 
~ C/lz. 
Respondents claim that three issues raised in petr' s peti-~ 
tion for certiorari and briefed again here are not properly be-
fore the court. The SG agrees with respondents with respect to 
two of those issues. He agrees that the initial determination of 
. '. f 
page b. 
I 
Title VII liability, and the establishment of the offipe of ad-
'1 
ministrator are not properly before the Court because ' k hey were 
imposed a decade ago and were affirmed by decisions of the Court 
of Appeals after which petr did not seek certiorari. In addition, 
both point out that the petitioner did not even raise these two 
issues in the very court of appeals decision that it is now chal-
lenging. In addition, both the SG and Respondent State of New 
York agree that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsid-
eration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have 
been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the original contra-
versy. They point out that the cases cited by petr involved 
challenges to both a civil contempt finding and an underlying 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. These 
~ cases are irrelevant when a party violates an unappealed perma-
nent injunction. See NLRB v. Local 282, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 428 F.2d 994, 999 (CA2 1970). I agree that 
the issues cannot be reopened in this contempt proceeding, and 
that this Court has spoken clearly on the issue. Maggio v. 
Zeitz, 333 u.s. 56, 68 (1948) ("It would be a disservice to the 
law if we were to depart from the long-standing rule that a con-
tempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or 
factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and 
thus become a retrial of the original controversy"). Accord Unit-
ed States v. Rylander, 460 u.s. 752, 756-757 (1983). In any 
event, petr' s arguments with respect to these two issues have 
little merit. The SG and respondents agree with this position. 
Petr has seriously mischaracterized the basis of the initial li-
~--------------------------------
ability holding, and the appointment of th~ administ'rator was 
___..... il 
reasonable. In addition, the retention of the Administrator in 
1983 was not before the court below and this Court should not 
address that issue. 
The Respondent, however, in addition, believes that the race 
conscious 29% goal is not properly before the Court for the same 
reason; although on this score the SG disagrees because the lat-
est order after the contempt proceedings, included in the AAAPO a 
new goal of 29;93% to be met by August 1987 under threat of se-
vere sanctions ih the event the goal is not met. Respondent 
State of New York points to language in the District Court's de-
cision that "[t]he new goal of 29.23% essentially is the same as 
the goal set in 1975." (A. 123) Petitioners may not avoid the 
~ effects of res judicata by challenging what is essentially a re-
iteration of a prior order. I agree with the SG that this issue 
is properly before the Court because the goal was modified and 
appealed from below. Finally, I think that the CA2 can be upheld 
-----~ 
in finding that the contempt remedies here did not convert this 
into a criminal contempt proceeding requiring all the attendant ~ 
goals, and I do not think this Court should. 
The ~ntral issu1 in these cases revolves around the kind of 
remedy imposed with respect to race conscious relief. 
~
I have 
discussed that issue in the memorandum relating to Local 93, No. 
84-1999, and I will repeat none of that here. A preliminary 
issue is whether this case should not be analyzed under Title VII 
because the DJ arguably imposed the goal sanction under his con-
tempt authority. I think it is highly artificial to say that a 
, I 
contempt sanction for a violation of an oroer stemm1ng from a 
' 'I 
Title VII violation could go beyond what Title VII it~elf per-
mits. What remains, I think is to consider whether what has been~'~~ 
done here con~s a "goal" or a "quota." As you point out in trl-
---- - -;;:::::,_ -;:::::. - . 'a~e:v" 
your memo to file, there is disagreement about this below in the 0 
CA2, as there is in the briefs here. The mere announcement by 
the DC that the 29.93% is a goal does not make it one. It seems 
apparent that the only similarity that this figure has to a goal 
is the fact that it is temporary. The DC has continuously or-
~ ---
dered that it be achieved by a certain date. Petrs in 84-1656 
1\. 
point out that the original Order and Judgment was written in 
mandatory terms, "By July 1, 1981, Local 28 and JAC are hereby f ~ 
6-c '> 
directed and ordered to achieve a non-white percentage of 29% tJM.c.-...d~ 
" Indeed the CA2 in its opinion noted that, for example, the ~ 
fund order was to terminate "when the membership goal set out" 
had been achieved. This underlines in my view the reality that 
------------~ 
what was done here constitutes a quota. --- The very existence of 
the union was apparently threatened unless the :·goal" was met. --------The focus of the remedy, if you will, has clearly become the 
mathematical target, rather than the efforts that are being un-
dertaken to reach the goal. The only factors cutting in favor of 
calling this a goal, that I can discern is the fact that once 
reached there will be no requirement that it maintained. In addi-
tion, because this is in the nature of a "hiring" quota, the im--
pact on innocent nonminorities is more spread around. These fac-
tors alone, however, are probably insufficient to avoid labeling 
this a quota. 
paye :~. 
I 
Similarly, the apprenticeship fund that exists for the bene-
il 
fits of nonwhites operates like a quota in that it s'$ ts aside 
certain moneys for nonminor i ties and excludes the use of those 
~ -----------
monies for others. There is no sense that this provision can 
~--------
defended as being akin to a goal. On the other hand, the SG 
points out that it would be ok to permit advertising in black 
areas to target increased membership in the union. Both programs 
set aside money, but one actually delivers a service to minor-
i ties that nonminor i ties are expressly excluded from. Because 
the fund is race specific and excludes nonminorities, you will 
probably want to strike it down. I think it is this exclusivity-
tionable. My only area of concern is that the fund be struck down -in a way that does not circumscribe a court's remedial power to 
order an employer to take other steps to reach a legitimate goal. 
My final point on quotas is a practical one, and one that 
suggests why perhaps it is understandable that the DC felt con-
strained to impose them. When a court is faced with intransi-
gence, and an employer or a union consistently fail to make any 
effort to correct its statutory or constitutional violation, it 
becomes increasingly difficult, I would think, for a court to 
measure compliance or good faith. The "quota" becomes a practi-
cal extension of the concept of a goal. Put another way, even 
when a goal is used, the "goal" may invariably become the stand-
ard by which compliance with the Court's wishes is measured. 
Given this reality, I am also not quite sure that an employer or 
-4!1du~ 
~~ 
a union might not react to a goal by feeling that 
something it must achieve. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I 




The only issue of any import in this case is whether the 
remedy imposed here is valid. For the reasons stated in my ac-
companying Memorandum in 84-1999, I believe that the SG is wrong 
that Title VII forbids all race-conscious relief, or, to put it 
........._~-·-··-----· ~-·------ ' -
the other way, requires a ediscernible victi;n for _!!_Very benefit ..._____ ______ ~
that flows from an 'nju ctive decree. Because even a goal, might 
......._ _____ ··-·····-.. ---- .. ···-
be considered by some to be race-conscious relief, your view on 
quotas represents a half-way point. If you agree that the remedy · _J 
here constitutes a fixed and rigid quota, then you will want to t 
reverse the decision of the CA2. 
I 
. " .. 
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84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland (CA6) (February 26) 
MEMO TO BOB: 
You also have 84-1656, Local 26 v . .EEOC that- like 
this case presents questions as to the validity of 
affirmative action plans that involve quotas, where the 
beneficiaries of the plan are not actual victims of racial 
discrimination. In view of Mike's work on Wygant, you and 
he should collaborate. 
This case and Local 26 are so closely related that 
some of the briefs (~,_the amicus brief of the AFL-CIO 
filed in 84-1656 also addresses 84-1999. 
This involves an affirmative plan, approved by the DC 
and CA6, with respect to promotions to positions of 
"officer" within the Firefighters Union in Cleveland. The 
plan itself, a rather complicated one, is set forth on 
pages A 4-7 of the opinion of CA6. I have not studied the 
plan enough to describe it in detail. Its purpose, 
however, was clear: to assure the preferential promotion 
of minorities to officer rank to correct a rather clear 
imbalance between whites and racial minorities at the 
officer level. If I under stand the plan correctly, it 
"• 
fairly can be viewed as providing "quotas" rather than 
rrere "goals", and without regard to proof of any 
discrimination against the minority firefighters who will 
be promoted the plan has an adverse impact on non-
minority firefighters. 
This case involves a question not presented in 84-
1656. The suit was instituted by an association of black 
and Hispanic firefighters under Title VII and the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming gross 
discrimination in promotions by the City's Firefighters 
Local AFL-CIO. This Local Union (No. 93) was not an 
original party to the suit. It was permitted to 
intervene, as a party of right, by the DC. After extended 
negotiations, encouraged by a Magistrate and the DC, the 
City and the minority association (The Vanguards of 
Cleveland) agreed to a "consent decree" in which the 
affirmative action promotion plan was approved by the 
court. Local 93, then an intervenor, did not agree to the 
consent decree, and formally objected to it. This consent 
decree was issued as a settlement prior to trial. The 
decree contained a number of recitals as to history of 
discrimination by the City of Cleveland's Division of 
Fire. The DC's order found that the plaintiffs had stated 
claims under Title VII, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The DC also certified a class consisting 
black and hispanic firefighters presently employed and 
"who in the future will be employed as firefighters". The 
plan specifically provided for a list of promotions to be 
made no later than February 10, 1983 that totaled well 
over a hundred of specific promotions. As noted above, I 
have not examined the plan closely enough, or the DC' s 
order, to be sure of the extent of which the affirmative 
action required would discriminate against white firemen -
though it is apparent that it would. The DC retained 
jurisdiction "with regard to any court challenges which 
may be presented to any of the promotional examinations or 
eligible lists provided for herein". 
The first question presented is whether the DC had 
authority to approve what is called a "consent plan" over 
the objective of a union and its members in the absence of 
the issues having being resolved in a trial. Although I 
hope it will not be necessary for us to decide the case on 
this issue, I am inclined to think the DC erred. 
The question of greater interest is similar in 
principle to the affirmative action question in 84-1656. 
There is this difference: in 84-1656 (referred to as the 
New York case) the plan was adopted by a private union. 
Here, the employer is the City of Cleveland, and the City 
approved the plan. Thus, Webber is more pertinent in the 
New York case, whereas Stotts is closer to this case. The 
specific question presented here was left open in Stotts. 
In my memo in the New York case, I relied on the amicus 
brief filed by Bredhoff and Kaiser on behalf of the AFL-
CIO local unions involved in both of these cases. This 
amicus brief views the affirmative action plans in both 
cases as involving quota systems that results in the 
deprivation of jobs or deferral of promotions, for white 
firefighters solely because of their race. The purpose 
was to make jobs and promotions available to minorities 
who have not themselves been victims of the discrimination 
concededly practiced by defendants in both of these cases. 
The amicus brief mentioned, as noted in my memo in 
the New York case, argues that quota systems are invalid 
under §706(g) of Title VII, as well as under §§1981 and 
1983. 
Again, as is the situation in the New York case, 
there must be a half dozen or more amici briefs with 
strong arguments being presented both pro and con for 
quota systems. As I have indicated in Wygant, I think 
there is a significant difference between quotas and 
goals, and accordingly - subject to further consideration 
and the views of my clerk - I am inclined to reverse in 
this case. 
LFP, JR. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell February 26, 1986 
From: Bob 
No.84-1999 
LOCAL 93 v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al. 
\ FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS /vyv 
I think this case is closer than Local 28 because of the 
--------~'------~'---
difficulty of measuring the impact of the promotion plan here. 
Denying a promotion is halfway between a layoff and a refusal to 
hire. Below is an argument for affirmance, to which I adhere, 
stressing the closeness of the case. 
My framework of analysis for this case is identical to that 
in Local 28 in that I conclude that Title VII does not preclude 
make-whole remedies that are not victim specific. ------------
·· ... ' 
paye L.. 
I 
Further, the union here has no basis to complain that its 
' 'I 
'I consent is essential to the approval of a consent decree. The 
petitioner union is required neither to do anything nor to for-
bear from any action as a result of the decree. T~~ights as a 
to the proceeding below are protected in that t~ ~ ~ 
to complain if the decree violates the substantive rights 
- of any of its members. For purposes of this case, those substan-
--------·-----------tive rights will have been violated only if the decree in ques-
tion runs afoul of the constraints of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Here there was an admission of a history of discrimina-
tory practices on the part of the city, of which the DC made note 
in approving the consent decree. Thus, the state's compelling 
interest in remedying past discrimination is great, and it re---
mains for the state to show that the means selected is narrowly 
-------------
tailored to the achievement of the compelling state purpose. 
Application of the Fullilove factors here provide a guide 
for determining whether the remedy is so narrowly tailored. 
First, relative to available alternatives, it is not entire-
ly clear to me that there might not have been some alternative 
methods, such as training courses with which to remedy the dis-
crimination here. On this record, however, it is difficult to 
~
assess the efficacy of those alternatives. The percentage relief 
permitted here, because it allows promotion only of qualified 
~ ~..--.._._ .......... __ ._............._... 
individuals is a valid alternative. Second, with respect to du-
ration, this remedy will cease to be employed once the goals are 
met. Third, with respect to the percentages chosen, they seem 
fair although it may be difficult to estimate. The minority pop-
I 
ulation of the City of Cleveland is over 47%, , and the decree es-
_....... .il 
tablishes goals that go no higher than 25% for the ran~ 1 of lieu--
tenant. Finally, with respect to flexibility, there would appear 
little room for the city to deviate from the agreed upon percent-
ages. On the other hand, that is arguably less important in a 
case in which an employer has consented to a particular rate of 
promotion. In addition, the DC does retain power to amend the 
-~- ~- --~ 
decree, and the decree requires the promotion of no minority that ----- - ·- - ------ -
is not qualified. These would appear to address the concerns of - --·---
flexibility. 
~ ~This leaves the question of the effect on nonminori ties. 
~tr' s apparently conceded at oral ar:;::nt that the City in-
creased significantly the number of promotions it was willing to 
make, thus reducing dramatically the impact on nonminor i _ties' 
promotibn expectations. On the other hand, it was also made 
plain that although all promoted would be qualified, some minor-
ities with lower scores would be promoted ahead of nonminorities 
with higher scores. If the logic of Wygant is that as long as ~ 
some victims can be identified, then the plan is not sufficiently~ 
narrowly tailored, then arguably those who score better than pro-~-._. _ __, ~~ 
moted nonminorities are identifiable and suffer as a result of 
this plan. On the other hand, if the purpose of Wygant is to 
focus on the gravity of harm to individuals, such as comparing a 
layoff goal to a hiring goal, then the harm in being passed over 
here is less great. I am inclined to a view, very slightly, that ~ ~ 
the broadening of the promotion pool here sufficiently tempered 
----------------------
the burden of the plan so as to make it a narrowly tailored plan. 
,. ' 
' 
I would affirm the decision below. 
. .. 
' l 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.tttJtrtmt aJDUd of t4t )!nittb .ibdt.s' 
JlM.S'lthtgton. ~. aJ. 2ll~'!~ , 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
February 28, 1986 
No. 84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
I passed at Conference to consider further the 
questions raised in this case. I am inclined to think the 
sole e tion that need be decided is whether a consent 
It \\ - --.,_ 
deere court order for purposes of §706(g). If not, 
then ev~ if the last sentence of §706(g) places limitations 
on a federal court's power to awar:d :race-conscious -rel-ief -to -
persons who have not been shown to be the victims of 
violations of Title VII, those limitations have no 
application in this case. It seems to me that the 
legislative history that has been cited to us suggests that 
Congre$s was concerned, both in 1964 and in 1972, with the 
possibility that courts might order employers or unions to 
remedy \proven violations of Title VII by adopting quotas, 
and with the possibility that Title VII might be interpreted 
as mandating quotas even in the absence of proven 
violations. The first concern may well have resulted in 
limitations on race-conscious relief embodied in the last 
sentence of §706(g), see Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. 
Stotts, --u.s.--, -- (1984), and the second is expressed 
1n the provisions of §703(j). See United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 u.s. 193, 205, n. 5 (1979). But ne1ther of these 
concerns is present where a voluntary settlement between 
plaintiff and defendant prov1oes ~ for these forms of relief, 
because in that situation, by definition, it is the 
agreement of the parties rather than the force of federal 
· w that creates the obligation to furnish race-conscious 
relief. Even where a voluntary settlement is submitted to a 
federal court in the form of a consent decree, that remains 
true. The obligation is creat d BY~he agreement of the 
parties. Whiletne federal 'court may- r~taib ju\risdiction to 
enforce the decree, I see no indication in the legislative 
history that the availability of federal enforcement of an 
obligation, rather than the creation of the obligation 
~ . 
. 
itself, was the focus of congressional concern. ~his 
difference, together with the strong congressional 
preference that Title VII be construed to encourage 
voluntary compliance, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 u.s. 36, 44 (1974); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 
461 U.S. 757, 770-771 (1983), persuades me that Congress did 
not intend to bar a federal court from approving a consent 
decree simply because the court might not be able to order 
the same relief after trial. 
Of course, if the relief provided for in a consent 
decree and agreed to by a public employer violates the 
r
F9f rteenth Amendment, the decree is unlawful and must be set 
aside. In this case, I am inclined to think it is 
unnecessary and inadvisable to reach this question. It is 
true that the Court of Appeals said that petitioner had 
standing to challenge the consent decree "on the grounds 
that it unlawfully infringes upon the constitutional rights 
of the non-minority firefighters," Pet. App. A-9, and that 
the court suggested that the Weber analysis would govern its 
analysis of any Fourteenth Amendment cl im. The ~et ~ ion 
for certiorari presented two que~tlon · l ~hether a-a istrict 
cou r t can adopt a consent decree providing relief that the 
court cou ~~ot order as a remedy after trial on a Title VII 
claim, a dkwbether a municipal employer can voluntarily 
adopt an affirmative action plan that awards relief to 
minority employees regardless of whether they were actual 
victims of past discrimination over the objections of an 
intervenor union. Neither question was phrased in 
constitutional terms, and judging from the body of the 
petition it does not appear that even the second question is 
a constitutional one. See Pet. for Cert. 7-8. Moreover, 
the Solicitor General did not suggest review of the 
constitutional question or brief it, and petitioner's brief 
includes but one passage suggesting a constitutional claim--
and that appears to be a due process claim, not one based on 
the Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for Petitioner 30-
31. At oral argument, both petitioner and the Assistant 
Attorney General suggested that this was a statutory case, 
I 
not a constitutional one. Under these circums ances, r 
think there is little basis for reaching the constitutional 
question, though I recognize that we have power to do so. 
There are also good reasons to refrain from 
addressing that question, given the posture of this case. 
JUSTICE POWELL's circulating draft in Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, No. 84-1340, would seem to indicate that 
a careful assessment of whether the remedy is narrowly 
tailored and will not inflict disproportionate harm on the 
interests of innocent non-victims, or unnecessarily trammel 
their rights, is essential to resolving the 
3. 
ll 
constitutionality of the affirmative act ion plan 'J See 
circulating draft, at 9-12. The constitutionality of the 
affirmative action plan, in my view, may therefore turn on 
the extent of the harm imposed on innocent non-victims, and 
on the extent to which the beneficiaries of the relief were 
actual or likely victims of past discrimination. The City 
suggests that by creating additional promotions it avoided 
harm to the white firefighters, but on the record before us 
that is not a question that can be resolved with any 
confidence. Nor do we know how the second and third phases 
of the affirmative action plan will affect the promotions 
available to white firefighters. 
( 
In this posture, I think we would do well to merely 
decide the statutory issue and leave open on remand the 
constitutional question to be considered after development 
of the facts. 
Sincerely, 
\ 
lfp/ss 02j28j86 CLEVE SALLY-POW 
84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Chief: 
My vote in this case is to reverse on the basis 
of the same analysis outlined in my letter of this date 
adivising that I would affirm 84-1656 Local 28 v. EEOC. 
These two cases are similar in many respects, but 
there are controlling differences. It is not contested 
that minorities had been discriminated against in 
promotions among Cleveland's firefighters. As was true in 
the New York case, the governmental interest was 
compelling in remedying the past discrimination. The 
question remains whether the city has shown that the means 
it selected is narrowly tailored to the achieving of its 
,' 
2. 
compelling purpose. In my view, no such showing has been 
made. 
Inflexible quotas were established for the 
promotion of blacks. It is true that to ameliorate the 
adverse effect of these quotas, the city increased the 
number of officers it would accommodate among the 
firefighters. In addition, it was contemplated that all 
applicants for promotion would have to take a test, and so 
long as minimum scores were made on these tests black 
applicants could be preferred over whites who had scored 
higher. The inevitable effect, it seems to me, is that in 
order to achieve the specified number of black officers in 
the various categories, better qualified white applicants 
would be denied promotion. 
3. 
In the New York case, it was conceded that no 
white had been or would be laid off by the DC's order. 
For me, this is a critically distinguishing fact. Nor was 
any suggestion made in the New York case that a less 
restrictive remedy of the past discrimination was 
available. In this case, identical goals could have been 
established for promotions to each category of rank, and 
the selections for promotion could have been made on the 
basis of considering all relevant factors. These would 
include not only race and test scores, but experience by 
the applicant within the firefighters, some demonstration 
of ability to lead that should be required in officers, 
and likelihood that the candidate for promotion would have 
the respect of fellow white and minority firefighters. In 
a word, rather than having arbitrary and inflexible quotas 
4. 
for each officer rank to be attained by specified dates 
(Bob and Mike, is this correct?), other fairer and more 
reasonable means to achieve the goal could have been 
adopted. The DC also could have retained jurisdiction -
as 1 believe it did - to assure that fairness in promotion 
was scrupulously followed in which race was one factor 
that should be considered but would not necessarily be 
controlling. 
(Mike and Bob: At Conference Justice White 
relied strongly on his opinion in Stotts as particularly 
relevant to the Cleveland case. Justice O'Connor seemed 
to agree with him. I have not reread Stotts. If there is 
merit to Justice White's view- and he was persuasive-
please draft a paragraph on the relevance of Stotts in 
5. 
Cleveland, and explaining why it would be less relevant in 
New York.) 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
~ .. ,. 
~~-d~l-~f~ 
 ~~ · .1-:AJ 
• 'I 
'\ 
~ ~ ~ ct, ~.scJ. . IJ. TV1. 
lfp/ss 02/28/86 CLEVE SALLY-POW 
84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Chief: 
-
My vote in this case is to reverse on the basis 
of the same analysis outlined in my letter of this date 
adivising that 1 would affirm 84-1656 Local 28 v. EEOC. 
These two cases are similar in many respects, but 
there are controlling differences. It is not contested 
that minorities had been discriminated against in 
promotions among Cleveland's firefighters. As was true in 
the New York case, the governmental interest was 
compelling in remedying the past discrimination. The 
question remains whether the city has shown that the means 
it selected is narrowly tailored to the achieving of its 
2. 
compelling purpose. In my view, no such showing has been 
made. 
Inflexible quotas were established for the 
promotion of blacks. It is true that to ameliorate the 
adverse effect of these quotas, the city increased the 
number of officers it would accommodate among the 
firefighters. In addition, it was contemplated that all 
applicants for promotion would have to take a test, and so 
long as minimum scores were made on these tests black 
applicants could be preferred over whites who had scored 
higher. The inevitable effect, it seems to me, is that in 
order to achieve the specified number of black officers in 
the various categories.~tt:; quali~hite applicants 
would be denied promotion. 





... ~~. ~. 
3. 
In the New York case, it was conceded that no 
white had been or would be laid off by the DC's order. 
For me, this is a critically distinguishing fact. Nor was 
any suggestion made in the New York case that a less 
restrictive remedy of the past discrimination was 
available. In this case, identical goals could have been 
established for promotions to each category of rank, and 
the selections for promotion could have been made on the 
basis of considering all relevant factors. These would 
include not only race and test scores, but experience by 
the applicant within the firefighters, some demonstration 
of ability to lead that should be required in officers, 
and likelihood that the candidate for promotion would have 
the respect of fellow white and minority firefighters. In 






for each officer rank ...t-e be ateeified by specifieEI date~ 
/o 
(Bob and Mike, is this correct?), other fairer and more 
reasonable means ~~chiev~e goal could have been 
<\ "' 
adopted. The DC also could have retained jurisdiction -
as 1 believe it did - to assure that fairness in promotion 
was scrupulously followed in which race was~e fact~ 
that should be considered but would not necessarily be 
controlling. 
(Mike and Bob: At Conference Justice White 
relied strongly on his opinion in Stotts as particularly 
relevant to the Cleveland case. Justice O'Connor seemed 
to agree with him. 1 have not reread Stotts. 1f there is () 
merit to Justice White's view - and he was persuasive -
please draft a paragraph on the relevance of Stotts in 
' ' ·~ ' 
' ' 
s. 
Cleveland, and explaining why it would be less relevant in 
New York.) 
Sincerely, 




lfp/ss 03j0lj86 Rider A, p. (Affirmative Action) 
R!DB SALLY-POW 
Local 93 (Cleveland) 
On the record before us, the court's order 
approving the consent decree fairly can be viewed as an 
impermissible quota under §706(g). It requires the 
employer to promote a fixed percentage of minorities, and 
its adverse effect on innocent non-minority employees 
could be substantial. In order to achieve the specified 
number of minority officers in various categories non-
minority employees almost certainly will be disadvantaged 
solely because of race. I would be inclined, therefore, 





invalid under both §706(g) and the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Sandra made a point, however, that had not 
occurred to me prior to our Conference. Her tentative 
position, as 1 understand it, is that there is a different 
between a consent decree and the imposition of a goal or 
quota by a court in the absence of such consent. 1 could 
agree with this view as a sensible way to dispose of the 
Cleveland case, particularly since the record leaves much 
to be desired. We did not grant cert on the 
constitutional question, and this is an additional reason 
for agreeing with the distinction that Sandra suggests 
between a consent decree and a remedy ordered by a 
District Court over the objection of the parties. 
If, however, we reach the substantive issues, 1 
would be inclined to hold that the remedial action ordered 
in Local 93 is an impermissible quota both under §706{g) 
and the Equal Protection Clause. 1 comment briefly on the 
latter . {Here, Mike, summarize my views). 
.• 
J 
lfp/ss 03/01/86 Rider A {Affirmative Action Cases) 
RIDAF SALLY-POW 
The distinction between a goal and a quota often 
is quite fact-specific. Expressed generally, a valid goal 
(see, e.g., my draft opinion in Wygant) would not require 
an employer to hire or promote a specified number of 
minority employees by a certain date without regard to the 
effect upon innocent non-minority employees. A quota 
would have these characteristics, including the burdening 
of rights of non-minorities. 1 do not think that goals 
would be ineffective, certainly where one is approved by a 
court. Where past discrimination has been found, a court 
will prohibit the engaging of such discrimination in the 
future, and will retain jurisdiction to assure compliance. 
In addition, a goal- e.g., say a 30% minority work force 
.. 
- could be set with a tentative target date for achieving 
it. The principal difference between the quota and the 
goal is that the latter would provide flexibility, 
including specifically the right of the employer to 
consider relevant factors pertinent to the qualifications 
of the applicant in addition to race, and would protect 
innocent employees from discharge or denial of equal 
opportunities for promotion. As the brief of the NMA 
notes, goals are generally approved by businesses and have 
proved efficacious in most cases. For the most part, the 
goals have been voluntarily adopted with the view to 
achieving a work force generally in accord with the number 
of reasonably qualified minorities in the available work 
force market. Under a goal there may be some adverse 
impact upon non-minorities who seek employment or 
promotion but this effect is diffused - again as I have 
stated in Wygant. 
Applying the foregoing to Local 28 (New York) is 
not easy in view of the problem that confronted the DC in 
that case. On its face, the DC's order would appear to be 
an impermissible quota as Judge Pierce, dissenting, was 
inclined to think. But one would hope that the situation 
that confronted the District Court was unique. The nature 
and degree of the discrimination by Local 28 was shocking. 
Moreover, the contemptuous conduct of that union in 
violating orders of the DC finally required that court to 
conclude that the 29% objective must be attained by a 
specific date. Yet, as counsel for the union stated at 
argument, there is no evidence that any non-minority 
member of the union had been laid off or adversely 
affected. Nor is there anything in the record before us 
to show that in achieving the 29% target, non-minorities 
will be penalized in the future. I do not think we can 
assume that they will. The DC already has been generous 
in granting extensions of time, and it has retained 
jurisdiction. 
In light of the foregoing views, and recognizing 
that the issue is a close one, my vote in Local 28 is to 
affirm. I will not be inclined to join an opinion that 
does not make clear the difference between goals and 
quotas - a difference both under Title VII and the Equal 
Protection Clause. I add ere that I would find no 
violation of equal protection under the special 
circumstances of the New York case. 
A A A 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 84-1999 Local 93 
March 5, 1~86 
' 'I ,., 
1. We did not discuss this case yesterday afternoon. In order to 
track more closely the letter of Justice O'Connor, I suggest one 
change. The last sentence of your note currently states: 
"I therefore agree with Sandra that it would be helpful to remand 
with directions to the DC to hold an evidentiary hearing as to 
the effect of the affirmative action plan on innocent non-
minority employees." I think the following language more 
closely tracks Justice O'Connor, and places the onus on the 
petitioners to object on constitutional grounds on remand: 
therefore agree with Sandra that this is an issue that should 
left open for consideration on remand." 
CHAMBERS Of" 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
Dear Chief: 
.Jlqtftmt Olouri of tlft ~tb i\hdt• 
•a•Jrinllt~ ~. <Ji. 2ll~l!~ 
March 6, 1986 
84-1656 Local 28 v. EEOC 
~ 
''j ,, 
Although I find this a close and difficult case, 
my tentative vote is to affirm. This vote is predicated 
primarily on the undisputed record of gross discrimination 
by the union over a period of at least two decades, and its 
intransigence in resisting every effort (including court 
orders) to implement appropriate remedies. (See the attached 
appendix). 
In addition, the District Court has been remark-
ably flexible over the years, and, importantly for me, un-
like Wygant, there is nothing before us to suggest that in-
dividual union members will have to be laid off. 
In sum, it seems to me that under the circum-
stances of this case, the courts had little option--in the 
exercise of their duty to end discrimination--other than to 
take the remedial action before us. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
APPENDIX (84-1656) 
In its . l975 opinion, the District Court remarked: 
The record in both state and federal courts 
against these [union and JAC] defendants is 
replete with instances of their bad faith 
attempts to prevent or delay affirmative ac-
tion. After [state] Justice Markowitz [in 
his 1964 state court proceeding] ordered im-
plementation of the Corrected Fifth Draft, 
with the intent and hope that it would create 
a •truly nondiscriminatory union[,]• Local 28 
flouted the court's mandate by expending 
union funds to subsidize special training 
sessions designed to give union members' 
friends and relatives a competitive edge in 
taking the JAC battery. JAC obtained an ex-
emption from state affirmative action regula-
tions directed towards the administration of 
apprentice programs on the ground that its 
program was operating pursuant to court 
order; yet Justice Markowitz had specifically 
provided that all such subsequent regula-
tions, to the extent not inconsistent with 
his order, were to be incorporated therein 
and applied to JAC's program. More recently, 
the defendants unilaterally suspended court-
ordered time tables for admission of forty 
non-whites to the apprentice program pending 
trial of this action, only completing the 
admission process under threat of contempt 
citations. . . . . 
In light of Local 28's and JAC's failure to 
•clean house• this court c.oncludes that the 
imposition of a remedial racial goal ••• is 
essential to place the defendants in a posi-
tion of compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. (A-352) 
CA2 in its 1976 opinion, stated that the record demon-
strated •a long and persistent pattern of discrimination,• 





il ing with "recalcitrant unions which have defied gflntler 
means of enforcement •••• " (A-215 to 216, 222). 
Finally, the CA2 in its 1985 opinion declared: "This 
court has twice recognized Local 28's long continued and 
egregious racial discrimination ••• and Local 28 has pre-
sented no facts to indicate that our earlier observations 
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84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Chief: 
At least for now, my vote is to ag re~ with Sandra's 
position. There i.s a difference bet wee~ the approval by a 
court of an agreement between the parties, and an order of a 
court that is contested by the employer. 
Although I thin~ it likely, under the consent de-
cree, that non-minority members of the unlon t.zill be dis-
criminated against in promotions, the record does not make 
this clear. Nor is any member of the union making a claim. 
I therefore agree with Sandra that this Js an issue that 
should be left open for consideration on remand. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.hprnut C!Jourt gf tift ~b .itatt• 
)Tulfinghm. ~. <lf. 2ll~l(.~ 
March 10, 1986 
RE: No. 84-1999 - Local 93 v. Cleveland 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
' ,, 
''I 




To: The Chiet J ust1ce 
Justice White 
b-L~~~f­
~ ~ ~'1>,/5!7-1 
Justice Marshall ...;' "? fJ 
Justice Blackmun ~
Justice Powell -
Justice Rfhnquis>-, ..,"'~ ~ 
Justice Stevens ·so·--t 
. Justice O'Connor~ . 
From: Justice Brennan 
c:(_ r;.._~~··- "' Circulated: --~-~-2 _S_'i9_S_S _ _ _ 
~~~-ct 
Al .. J.. J- . ~ lstDRAFT · ~ Lf ~· t..-t.-- S ~ 'C a..,1~ 
~7- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES t/"J't--~.t,j1 z 0 J ~ 
~ VI..-~ ~ No. 84-1999 ~~ ~ ~ U}(J/j 
E 1 {) ft, (_1) !r{ / v~ U.JJ- I 0 ~f L.e-114- 4; 1 . 
7 LOCALINUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSO-S~ ~ ~
V2v- --t~r--~ CIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO j,; if 
w'/ . 
1 
f f _ C. L. C., PETITIONER v. CITY ' ~ J. (/ 
v /I () u ~'}) 4 ~ - I I OF CLEVELAND ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1986] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent de-
cree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who 
were not the actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory 
practices. 
I 
tAf' / On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (the Van-
. ~ guards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters 
, / employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging 
/ the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred 
/ to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of 
4.. ~ o race and national origin "in the hiring, assignment and pro-
D --- motion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire De-
W~ ~ partment." App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a 
I ' ~ -e.+ class of blacks and Hisp:,1nics consisting of firefighters already 
~ employed by the City, applicants for employment, and "all 
- I 'f blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employ-
2 , ~ G ~ s ~ ment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire 
~k  ? Department." Id., at 8. 
- "). 2. The Vanguards claimed that the City had violated the 
3 















2 FIREFIGHTERS v. CLEVELAND 
Fourteeth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C.§§ 2000e 
et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although the com-
plaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and 
work assignments, the ~ chargeq that 
black and Hispanic firefighters "have ... been discriminated 
against b their race a national ori 'n in the 
awarding romotion 'thin the Fire Department." Id., 
at 11. 1 The comp aint averred that this discrimination was 
effectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City. 
The written examination used for making promotions was al-
leged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said 
to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the 
manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not 
be near the top of promotion lists when positions became 
available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority 
advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new 
promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the 
effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from 
certain litigation commenced in 1973. 
As just noted, the Vanguards' lawsuit was not the first in 
which the City had to defend itself against c4arges of race 
discrimination in hiring and promotion in its civil services. 
In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an action 
' The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the 
lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion 
Chief, Assistant Chief and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter 
must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written exami-
nation. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80% 
of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a 
place on a promotion eligibility list . Although rankings on the lists are 
based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis 
of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to 
remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year, 
and, as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full two year 
period. Promotions are mad.e from the lists as positions become available. 
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alleging that the Police Department discriminated against 
minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City 
of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District 
Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining 
certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing mi-
nority hiring goals. In 1.[L7, these hiring goals were ad-
justed and promotion goals- were established ursuant to a 
consent decree. Therea ter, 1tlga 1on raising similar claims 
was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in 
a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a 
consent decree imposing hiring quotas similar to those or-
dered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of 
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio 1973). In 1977, after ad-
ditional litigation, the Headen court approved a new plan 
governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department. 
By the time the Vanguards filed their complaint, then, the 
City had already unsuccessfully contested many of the basic 
factual issues in other lawsuits. Naturally, this influenced 
the City's view of the Vanguards' case. As expressed by 
counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court: 
"[W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleve-
land had e~ears at that point of litigating these 
types of cases, an eight years of having judges rule 
agamst the City of Clevelana. · 
rry ou don't have to beat us on the head. We finally 
learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do 
to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city 
to comply with the law fully .... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 
41-42. 
Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litiga-
tion, the City entered into "serious settlement negotiations" 
with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980, 
from Edward R. Stege and Mark I. Wallach to Hon. Thomas 
J. Lambros. 
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International 
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. (Local 93 or 
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the Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland's 
firefighters, moved pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) 
to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District Court granted 
the motion and ordered the Union to submit its complaint in 
intervention within 30 days. 
Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document 
entitled "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." Despite 
its title, this document did not allege any causes of action or 
assert any claims against either the Vanguards or the City. 
It expressed the view that "[p]romotions based upon any cri-
terion other than competence, such as a racial quota system, 
would deny those most capable from their promotions and 
would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from main-
taining the best possible fire fighting force," and asserted 
that "Local #93's interest is to maintain a well trained and 
properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends 
that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated 
competency, properly measured by competitive examinations 
administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of 
Federal, State, and Local laws." I d., at 27, 28. The "com-
plaint" concluded with a prayer for relief in the form of an in-
junction requiring the City to award promotions on the basis 
of such examinations. I d., at 28. 
In the meantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and 
the City continued, and a proposed consent decree was sub-
mitted to the District Court in November, 1981. This pro-
posal established "interim procedures" to be implemented "as 
a two-step temporary remedy" for past discrimination in pro-
motions. I d., at 33. The first step required that a fixed 
number of already planned promotions be reserved for minor-
ities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant, 
3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promo-
tions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to As-
sistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. I d., 
at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of 
"appropriate minority promotion goal[s]," id., at 34, for the 
.. . , . 
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ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The pro-
posal also required the City to forego using seniority points 
as a factor in making promotions. I d., at 32-33. The plan 
was to remain in effect for 9 years, ami could be extended 
upon mutual application of the parties for an additional6-year 
period. I d., at 36. 
The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of 
January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent 
decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional 
goals and to the 9-year life of the decree. In addition, the 
Union protested the fact that it had not been included in the 
negotiations. This latter objection particularly troubled the 
District Judge. Indeed, although hearing evidence pre-
sented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the 
decree, the Judge stated that he was "appalled that these ne-
gotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the 
intervenors . . . , " and refused to pass on the decree under 
the circumstances. Tr. of January 7, 1982, Proceedings 
Before the Hon. Thomas J. Lambros 134. Instead, he con-
cluded, "I am going at this time to defer this proceeding until 
another day and I am mandating the City and the [Van-
guards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in 
dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their par-
ticular problems." I d., at 151. At the same time, Judge 
Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its 
objections more specific to accomplish anything: "I don't 
think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their posi-
tion on the basis that, 'Well, Judge, you know, there's some-
thing inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not 
fair.' We need more than that." Id., at 153. 
A second hearing was held on April 27. Local 93 contin-
ued to oppose any form of affirmative action. Witnesses for ____. ,. 
all parties testified concerning the · ro ~e.
Thetest1mony revea ed that, while the consent decree dealt 
only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned 
by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to 
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make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to 
hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battal-
ion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros 
proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high num-
ber of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The 
Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants 
rather than 40, it could "plug in a substantial number of black 
leadership that can start having some influence in the opera-
tion of this fire department" while still promoting the same 
non-minority officers who would have obtained promotions 
under the existing system. Tr. of April 27, 1982, Proceed-
ings Before Hon. Thomas D. Lambros 147-148. Additional 
testimony revealed that this approach had led to the amicable 
resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Georgia. Judge 
Lambros persuaded the parties to consider revamping the 
consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta plan. The pro-
ceedings were therefore adjourned and the matter was re-
ferred to a United States Magistrate. 
Cou!!§_e~arties particip~ in forty hours of 
intensive ne otiations unc1e:itfie Magistrate~~ion 
an agreed to a ev1sed consent ae~Ii"a"tincorporated a 
modifiedvers1on ~~. See App. 79 (Report of 
Magistrate). However, submission of this proposal to the 
court was made contingent upon approval by the membership 
of Local 93. Despite the fact that the revised consent decree 
actually increased the number of supervisory positions avail-
able to non-minorit firefighters , the Union members over-
whelmingly ejected he proposal. 2 - ~ 
2 The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magis-
trate's Report to the District Court: 
"Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a 
touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable rec-
ommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union's Ex-
ecutive Board would be given serious consideration by the general mem-
bership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit , 
pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations, have again strained rela-
tions between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feel-
84-1999-0PINION 
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On January 11, 1983, the Vanguards and the City lodged a 
second amended consent decree with the court and moved for 
its approval. is proposal was "patterned very closely 
upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of 
[the] Magistrate ... ," App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus 
its central feature was the creation of many more promo-
tional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically, 
the decree required that the City immediately make 66 pro-
motions to Lieutenant, 32 promotions to Captain, 16 promo-
tions to Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief. 
These promotions were to be based on a promotional exami-
nation that had been administered during the litigation. The 
66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split be-
tween minority and non-minority firefighters. However, 
since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level 
positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be 
promoted. The decree further required promotional exami-
nations to be administered in June of 1984 and December of 
1985. Promotions from the lists produced by these examina-
tions were to be made in accordance with specified promo-
tional "goals" that were expressed in terms of percentages 
and were different for each rank. The list from the 1985 
examination would remain in effect for 2 years, after which 
time the decree would expire. The life of the decree was 
thus shortened from 9 years to 4. In addition, except where 
necessary to implement specific requirements of the consent 
decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a factor in 
ranking candidates for promotion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
A29-A38. 
ings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped 
that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is 
not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such 
reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together, 
without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals 
rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engag-
ing in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for 
optimism at this time." App. 78. 
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Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph 
16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning 
compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. !d., at 
A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdic-
tion with respect to applications or claims made by "any 
party, including Intervenor." !d., at A38. The decree im-
posed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93. 
On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the mem-
bers of the plaintiff class o t e erms o t e ~ecree. 
In~o wis ed to object to the proposal 
were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93 
filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent 
decree: 
"Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly main-
tained that there must be a more equitable, more fair, 
more just way to correct the problems caused by the 
[City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be 
unnecessary 'remedial' methods embodied in the law 
have been explored and some have been utilized. 
"Local #93 reiterates it's [sic] absolute and total objec-
tion to the use of racial quotas which must by their very 
nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire Serv-
ice. Since this problem is obviously the concern of the 
collective representatives of all members of the fire serv-
ice, Intervenors, Local #93. [sic] We respectfully urge 
this court not to implement the 'remedial' provisions of 
this Decree." Objections to Consent Decree 3. 
Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and 
necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still 




1 In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced 
objections to the~osed consentdecreeGlPersonalletters fo the District 
Courr.-1'heoasis of their objections was the same as the Union's. App. 
to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (Memorandum Opinion and 
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The District Court approved the consent decree on Janu-
ary 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that "[t]he documents, 
statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April 
1982 hearings reveal a historical Qattern o~cial .!!!.scrimina­
tiQn ~n the promotional practices of the City of Cleveland Fire 
Department." App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleve-
land A3-A4. He then observed: 
"While the concerns articulated by Local 93 may be 
valid, the use of a(.g§!a systiiiJ for the relatively short 
period of four years 1s not unreasonable in light of the 
demonstrated history of racial discrimination in promo-
tions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is 
neither unreasonable nor unfair to re~ire non-min'orlfy 
firefig ter_Lw o, alt ough t_!Iez__ co~Q. wrong, 
benfitted from the ef!ects of the discri~n to bear 
some ofthehurdenofthe'-rem~y. ~urthermore, the 
amended p~re reasonable and less burden-
some than the nine-year plan that had been proposed 
originally." I d., at A5. 
The Judge therefore overruled the Union's objection and 
adopted the consent decree "as a fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate~aims raised in this action." Ibid. 
The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for "all pur-
poses of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th[e] 
Decree upon application of any party . . .. " App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 38. 
The Union ap eale the overruling of its objections. A 
panel for e ourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
one judge dissenting. 753 F . 2d 479 (1985). The court re-
jected the Union's claim that the use of race-conscious relief 
was "unreasonable," finding such relief justified by the statis-
tical evidence presented to the District Court and the City's 
express admission that it had engaged in discrimination. 
The court also found that the consent decree was "fair and 
reasonable to non-minority firefighters," emphasizing the 
"relatively modest goal~ set forth in the plan," the fact that 
• 
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"the plan does not require the hiring of unqualified minority 
firefighters or the discharge of any non-minority 
firefighters," the fact that plan "does not create an absolute 
bar to the advancement of non-minority employees," and the 
short duration of the plan. I d., at 485. 
After oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this 
Court decided Firefighters Local Union No . 1784 v. Stotts, 
467 U. S. 561 (1984). "Concerned with the potential impact 
of Stotts," the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submit 
supplemental briefs, 753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately 
concluded that Stotts did not affect the outcome of the case. 
The court noted that the District Court in Stotts had issued 
an injunction requiring layoffs over the objection of the City, 
while in this case the City of Cleveland had agreed to the 
plan. The court reasoned that even if Stotts holds that Title 
VII limits relief to those who have been actual victims of dis-
crimination, "[t]he fact that this case involves a consent de-
cree and not an injunction makes the legal basis of the Stotts 
decision inapplicable." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 4 
Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The 
so~b~ petitjon is wh~er the consent de-
cree is an impermissible remedy under § 706(g) of Title VII. 5 ----
'The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the 
injunction imposed by the District Court in that case "had the direct effect 
of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority 
workers," while "[i]n this case, the consent decree assured the integrity of 
the existing seniority system." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 
5 The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions: 
"1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting 
to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order 
as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial? 
"2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action 
promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected 
to represent all employees when said ro tio I erne adverse! affects 
the rights and in~m_£loye_es and awards relief to..Jllinority em-
ployees regardless of whether £lleywere actual victims of past racial dis-
crimmation ?" Pet.r~, 
. . . .. 
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Local 93 argues that the consent decree disregards the ex-
press-p;-ohibition of the last sentence of § 706(g) that -
---· -- --- --...._ -.....__ -
"[n]o order of the court shall require the admission or 
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or 
the hiring, reinstatement, or Eromotion of an individual 
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, 
if such individual was refused admission, sus ended or 
expelleQ,Or_ was re]useaemJ!lo~or advancertJ&11.,t or 
was sus~ed or discharged for any_ reason other than 
discriminatwnon ~nt 0 race color,-l:!iligion, sex, 
~
or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of 
this title." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). 
According to Local 93, this sentence precludes a court from 
awarding relief under Title VII that may benefit individuals 
who were not the actual victims of the employer's discrimina-
tion. The Union argues further that the plain language of 
the provision that "[n]o order of the court" shall provide such 
relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in 
addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the 
Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII 
litigation is invalid if-like the consent decree approved in 
this case-it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit indi-
viduals who are not themselves actual victims of an employ-
The first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes 
the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can con-
ceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect 
of the consent decree on petitioner's legal rights, neither the petition for 
certiorari nor the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than 
whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII. 
Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent de-
cree was "reasonable," and then, after Stotts was decided, to whether the 
consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District 
Court's retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press what-
ever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at --. 
Therefore, we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether 
§ 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree . 
( 
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. ~ 
·j. ··, 
er's discrimination. The Union is supported by the United 
States as amicus curiae. 6 
We granted the petition in order to answer this important 
question of federal law. -- U. S. -- (1985). We hold 
today in Local28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ante, at 
--, that courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief 
under Title VII that benefits individuals who were not the ac-
tual victims of a defendant's discriminatory practices. We 
need not decide whether this is one of those cases, however. 
For we hold that whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court 
from imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after 
trial, that provision does not apply to relief awarded in a con-
sent decree. 7 We therefore affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
II 
We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress 
intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means 
of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albermarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United 
States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CA8 
1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers "to 
self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices 
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last ves-
tiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's 
history"). See also, International B'hd of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. 
6 The United States took exactly the opposite position in United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for the 
United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 0. T. 1978, Nos. 432, 435, and 
436, pp. 26-38. 
'We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is 
intended to express a view as to the extent of a court's remedial power 
under§ 706(g) in cases where that provision does apply. That question is 
addressed in Local28 v. EEOC, ante, at-. 
' 1''$ • . 
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EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228 (1982); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, 
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 461 U. S. 757, 
770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promul-
gated guidelines setting forth its understanding that "Con-
gress strongly encouraged employers . . . to act on a 
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems 
which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity 
.... " 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC: 
"The principle of nondiscrimination in employment be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and 
the principle that each person subject to Title VII should 
take voluntary action to correct the effects of past dis-
crimination and to prevent present and future dis-
crimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually 
consistent and interdependent methods of addressing so-
cial and economic conditions which precipitated the en-
actment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to 
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be 
encouraged in order to carry out the Congressional in-
tent embodied in Title VII." !d. § 1608.1(c) (footnote 
omitted). 
It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to em-
ployers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination 
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits in-
dividuals who were not actual victims of discrimination. 
This was the holding of United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). In Weber, an employer and a 
union agreed in collective bargaining to reserve for black em-
ployees 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft-training pro-
gram until the percentage of black craftworkers in the plant 
was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local 
labor force. After considering both the purposes of Title 
VII and its legislative history, we concluded that "it would be 
ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over 
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centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of 
those who had 'been excluded from the American dream for 
so long' constituted the first legislative prohibition of all vol-
untary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." I d., at 204 (ci-
tation omitted). Accordingly, we held that Title VII permits 
employers and unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable 
race-conscious affirmative action, although we left to another 
day the task of "defin(ing] in detail the line of demarcation 
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action 
plans." I d., at 208. 
1 
Of course, Weber involved a purcl,~ate contractual 
agreement rather than a consent decree. But, at least at 
first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distin-
guish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and 
voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litiga-
tion. Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands , Inc., 450 
U. S. '79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court's 
order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under 
28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines 
Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary set-
tlement of employment discrimination claims" under Title 
VII. Moreover, the EEOC's guidelines concerning "Mfirm-
ative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964," 29 CFR Part 1608, plainly contemplate the use 
of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary af-
firmative action. See, e. g., id. § 1608.8. 8 True, these 
guidelines do not have the force of law, General Electric Co. 
v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they "constitute 
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id., at 142 
8 The EEOC has not joined the Brief for the United States in this case. 
The Solicitor General's brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney 
General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII , 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the federal government in its capacity 
as an employer, id. § 2000e-16. 
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(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no rea-
son to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermis-
sible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a con-
sent decree. 
Local 93 and the Solicitor General find a contrary indicator 
in § 706(g), wh1ch governs e urts' remedial power under 
Title VII. They, contend that § 706(g) establishes an inde-
pendent limitation on w at u -as opposed to employers 
or unions-can do, pro i 1tmg ny "order of the court" from 
providing relierthat may benefit non-victims. They argue 
that a consent decree should be treated as an "order" within 
the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force 
and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely 
for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent de-
crees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as 
a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to mod-
ify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objec-
tion of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 
U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift /1); third, that non-compliance 
with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt 
of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435, 
440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.). 
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of 
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, be-
cause their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement 
of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble con-
tracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
420'0. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour & 
Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we 
have previously recognized, consent decrees "have attributes 
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character 
that has resulted in different treatment for different pur-
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poses. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether 
we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judg-
ment," for we can do both. The question is whether, given ....___,. 
their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns 
embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating 
them as "orders" within the meaning of that provision. 
The co11clusion in Weber that "Congress chose not to forbid 
all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action" when it en-
acted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative his-
tory, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned 
to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discre-
tion. Weber, supra, at 205-207. As originally enacted, 
Title VII re lated only private enterprises; the liberal Re-
pub 1cans and Sout ern emocrats whose support was cru-
cial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings 
about the potential for government intrusion into the mana-
gerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was 
necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. I d., at 206. 
Their votes were obtained only after they were given assur-
ances a 'management perogat1ves, an umon eedoms 
aret:Obe left und1stur6ed to the greatest extent possible." 
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 
(1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (remarks of Rep. 
Celler); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 14314 
(remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep. 
McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than 
seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more con-
servative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of 
power in 1964 "were far more concerned to avoid the intru-
sion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard 
would entail." Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65 
Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra, 
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Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating about "pref-
erential treatment or quotas in employment" because it be-
lieved that "the problems raised by these controversial ques-
tions are more properly handled at a governmental level 
closer to the American people and by communities and indi-
viduals themselves"). 
The legislative history pertaining specifically to § 706(g) 
suggests that it was drafted with this concern in mind and, in 
fact, that Congress added the last sentence of§ 706(g) specifi-
cally to protect managerial perogatives of employers and un-
ions.9 See Local28 v. EEOC, ante, at----- (discuss-
ing the legislative history). See also, H. R. Rep. No. 914, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. ·12 (1963) (first version of § 706(g) 
preserving employer defense of "cause"); 110 Cong. Rec. 
2567-2571 (amending this version to substitute "for any rea-
son other than discrimination" in place of "cause"); id., at 
2567 (remarks of Rep. Celler, the amendment's sponsor, that 
the amendment's purpose was "to specify cause"); id., at 6549 
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey that § 706(g) makes clear "that 
employers may hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote 
for any reason, good or bad" except when such decisions 
violate the substantive provisions of Title VII). Thus, even 
if the last sentence of § 706(g) does limit the power of federal 
courts to compel employers and unions to take certain actions 
that the employers or unions oppose and would not otherwise 
take, § 706(g) simply is not concerned with obligations that 
'Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Al-
though the legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the 
same concern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental 
employers that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector, 
there is also no indication that Congress intended to leave governmental 
employers with less latitude than had been left to employers in the private 
sector when Title VII was originally enacted. See generally, Subcommit-
tee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legis-
lative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972). 
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are created by voluntary action of employers or unions. 10 
From this, it is readily apparent that consent decrees are ~ 
no~he "o~s" referred to in §7G6Cg), for 
the voluntary nature of a cOriSent decree is its most funda-
mental characteristic. See United States v. ITT Continen-
tal Baking Co., 420 U. 8., at 235-237; United States v. Ar-
mour & Co. , supra; Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 
(1952); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co. , 360 U. S. 19 
(1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S. 900, 902 (1983) 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As 
we observed in United States v. Armour & Co.: 
"Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case 
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on 
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to lit-
igate the issues involved in the case and thus save them-
selves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. 
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a 
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimi-
nation of risk, the parties each give up something they 
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation. 
Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; 
rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to 
each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much 
of those opposing purposes as the respective parties 
have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. " 402 
U. 8., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
10 This is not to suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions is 
outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on non-minorities. 
We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trai l 
Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976) , and Weber, supra. We hold only that 
such concerns were not the source of§ 706(g), which focuses on preserving 
certain management perogatives from interference by the federal courts. 
The rights of non-minorities with respect to action by their employers are 
delineated in§ 703 of Title Vll, 42 U. S. C.§ 2000e-2. See Weber , supra. 
' . 
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Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source 
of the court's authority to enter any judgment at all. See 
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (can-
not enter consent decree to which one party has not con-
sented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). More 
importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than 
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally 
based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent de-
cree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress 
placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose ob-
ligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of Title 
VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are cre-
ated by a consent decree. 
The features of consent decrees designated by the Union 
and the Sqlicitor General do not require a contrary result. 
The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered 
after a trial obviously does not implicate Congress' concern 
with limiting the power of federal courts unilaterally to re-
quire employers or unions to make certain kinds of employ-
ment decisions. The same is true of the court's conditional 
power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an 
unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a 
consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations 
were created by agreement of the parties rather than im-
posed by the court. 11 Finally, we reject the argument that a 
consent decree should be treated as an "order" within the 
meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation 
for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative his-
tory that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obliga-
tion, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the 
focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement 
is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a col-
11 However, as is discussed below, the court's exercise of the power to 
modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate 
§ 706(g). Infra, at -- - .-. 
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lective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent 
decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But 
the difference between contractual remedies and the con-
tempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with re-
spect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement 
scheme-whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have 
an agreement entered as a consent decree-is itself made vol-
untarily by the parties. 12 Thus, it does not implicate Con-
gress' concern that federal courts not impose unwanted ob-
ligations o e lo er and unions any more t an the decision 
to institu ace-conscious affirmative action in the first 
place; in both cases the parties have t emse ves created ob- I 
ligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutu-
ally satisfactory compromise. 
12 Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather 
than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator 
points out, "[p)ublic law settlements are often complicated documents de-
signed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-of-
court settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to 
continuing oversight and interpretation by the court." Schwarzschild, 
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fair-
ness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887, 899 (foot-
note omitted). In additi,on to this advantage, the National League of Cit-
ies adds: 
"[a) consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling liti-
gation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it 
will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be 
shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court 
that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a 
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be 
easier to channel iitigation concerning the validity and implications of a 
consent decree into a single forum-thus avoiding the waste of resources 
and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations." Brief for the Na- J 
tiona! League of Cities, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 
25. 
For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become wi I used as de-
vices to facilitate settlement. n eed, we have little doubt that the inter-
pretation of§ 706(g) proposed by the Union and the Solicitor General would 
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III 
Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, supra, and Railway 
Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961), Local 93-again 
joined by the Solicitor General-contends that we have rec-
ognized as a general principle that a consent decree cannot 
provide greater relief than a court could have decreed after a 
trial. They urge that even if§ 706(g) does not directly invali-
date the consent decree, that decree is nonetheless void be-
cause the District Court "would have been powerless to order 
[such an injunction] under Title VII, had the matter actually 
gone to trial." Brief for Petitioner 17. 
We concluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent 
decree of race-conscious relief that may "benefit non-victims 
dlJes not-viOlate the con essionaf objectives of§ 706(g). It 
is erefore ar to understand tne as1s for an in ependent 
judicial canon or "common-law" of consent decrees that would 
give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway. 
To be sure, a federal court is more than "a recorder of con-
tracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is "an 
organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions 
" 1B Moore, Lucas & Currier, Moore's Federal Prac-
tice ~ 0.409[5], at p. 331 (2d ed. 1984) (hereinafter Moore). 
Accordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to 
resolve ~e within the court's subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Y urthermore, consistent with this requirement, the 
consent decree must "come[] within the general scope of the 
case made by the pleadings," Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 
101 U. S. 289, 297 (1879), and must further the objectives of 
the law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CAlO 1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment v. Gorsuch, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (CADC 1983), 
make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary 
to the expressed congression.al preference for voluntary remedial action. 
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cert. denied,-- U. S. -- (1984). However, in addition 
to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties' con-
sent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See Pa-
cific Railroad v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 1127-1128; Note, The Consent 
Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 
72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 (1959). Therefore,_~ fed~ral 
court-isnot barred from enterin a consent decree merely be-
cause the decree provi es broader relief than the court could 
ha\Te1iWarded ane?a tfial. See, e. g-:;-Facific R ailroad v. 
Ketc1tum, supra, at '295-297; Swift & Co. v. United States, 
276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928) (Swift!) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a 
Better Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 1127-1130; 
Sansom Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539 
(CA3), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1984); Turner v. Orr, 
759 F. 2d 817, 825-826 (CAS 1985). 13 
Local 93 argues that Railway Employees v. Wright and 
Firefighters v. Stotts establish a ,pifferent rule. But those · 
cases_dealt with the 'modification of a consent decree over the 
ob~f a party, not wiEhthe initial aaoption of a decree 
at the parties' request. As one commentato~ has noted, 
movin om uestions about the '6riginal decree to questions 
about its modification raises "ent1re y 1 erent consider-
atioils:::Conslclerati-;;hs that derive both from tne historic role ___., 
of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of the 
injunctive relief itself." Htmdler, Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972) (hereinaf-
ter Handler). These considerations distinguish cases involv-
ing the court's power to make disputed modifications of a con-
sent decree. 
Courts have traditionally recognized that because "an in-
junction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing 
13 We do not hold that a federal court is required to approve such a con-
sent decree. We need not address here what grounds might justify a 
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court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers 
and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that eq-
uitable relief," the court retains power to modify or vacate 
injunctions when necessary. Railway Employees v. Wright, 
364 U. S. , at 647; Handler 24. Moreover, this power inheres 
in the court's equitable authority whether an injunction was 
decreed by consent or after litigation: 
"Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very 
terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with 
its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted, 
power there still would be by force of principles inherent 
in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree 
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always 
to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The 
result is all one whether the decree has been entered 
after litigation or by consent. In either event, a court 
does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its man-
date if satisfied that what it has been doing has been 
turned through changing circumstances into an instru-
ment of wrong." Swift II, 286 U. S., at 114-115 (cita-
tions omitted). 
At the same time, countervailing policies of finality and res 
judicata have led to limitations on this power that insure its 
cautious exercise. Thus, in declining to modify a consent de-
cree entered between the Federal Government and numer-
ous meat-packing companies, Justice Cardozo stated: 
"There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of 
the inquiry proper to the case before us. We are asking 
ourselves whether anything has happened that will jus-
tify us now in changing a decree. The injunction, 
whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment 
in its application to the conditions that existed at its 
making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the 
guise of readjusting. Life is never static, and the pass-
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ness as it has to every other. The inquiry for us is 
whether the changes are so important that dangers, once 
substantial have become attenuated to a shadow. No 
doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is 
relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme 
and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are 
the victims of oppression; Nothing less than a clear 
showing of grevious wrong evoked by new and unfore-
seen conditions should lead us to change what was de-
creed after years of litigation with the consent of all con-
cerned." ld., at 119. 
The party seeking modification of a consent decree thus 
must adduce evidence showing that circu'Ii1stariCeS are suffi-
ciently altered to justify changing the terms of the decree. 
See also, Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). If 
the movant meets this heavy burden, the court may make the 
modification even over the objection of other parties to the 
decree, resting continued imposition of legal restraint on the 
strength of the original consent because that initial agree-
ment necessarily required recognition of the court's power to 
modify. Swift II, supra, at 114. Nevertheless, completely 
new circumstances prevail with respect to the new term. As 
to that term there has never been an agreement among the 
parties, and it would put too much into their initial consent to 
suppose that it authorized the court to impose any and every 
particular form of relief that might seem appropriate to the 
court at some future date. Unable to rely on the parties' 
consent, the court must rely entirely on the underlying stat-
ute for authority with respect to the modified term. In 
other words , while the parties' original consent empowered 
the court to issue an injunction that incorporated broader re-
lief than could have been awarded after a trial, the absence of 
such consent in contested proceedings to modify the decree 
limits the court's remedial power to what is authorized by the 
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These principles both explain and distinguish the cases re-
lied upon by the Union. In Firefighters v. Stotts, supra, the 
plaintiffs and the City of Memphis entered into a consent de-
cree that included the use of racial preferences for hiring and 
promoting firefighters. After the decree had been in effect 
for just over a year, budget deficits forced Memphis to layoff 
a number of firemen. Because layoffs pursuant to Memphis' 
"last hired, first fired" rule would undo the gains made by mi-
nority firefighters under the decree, the plaintiffs sought and 
obtained an injunction requiring Memphis to modify its se-
niority rules to protect new black employees. We reversed. 
We held first that the injunction could not be justified as nec-
essary to enforce the terms of the consent decree. 467 
U. S., at 572-576. The plaintiffs argued in the alternative 
that the injunction was a proper modification of the decree. 
We noted that 
"a district court cannot enter a disputed modification of 
a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting 
order is inconsistent with that statute. Thus, Title VII 
necessarily acted as a limit on the District Court's au-
thority to modify the decree over the objections of the 
City . ... " !d., at 576, n. 9 (emphasis added). 
Because we concluded that the District Court would have 
been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such 
as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583; see also, 
Local 28 v. EEOC, ante, at -----, we rejected the 
plaintiffs' argument and held that "the District Court was 
precluded from granting such relief over the City's objection" 
by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577, n. 9. 
Railway Employees v. Wright, supra, also involved a dis-
puted modification of a consent decree. In that case, a rail-
road and the unions representing most of its employees were 
charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in 
violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 
The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among 
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that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time. 
When the Act was amended several years later to permit 
union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree; 
their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the rail-
road. This Court reversed the District Court's denial of this 
motion, holding that refusal to modify constituted an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized 
that "a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification 
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, 
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance 
have changed, or new ones have arisen." 364 U. S., at 647. 
The Court explained that such changes may be so significant 
that not to modify the decree at the request of an aggrieved 
party would be an abuse of discretion, and also that refusal to 
modify an injunction was more likely to constitute an abuse of 
discretion "when the new circumstances involve a change in 
law rather than facts." I d., at 648. In fact, based on these 
principles, the Court regarded as "established" the conclu-
sion that, had the decree before the Court represented relief 
awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion 
to deny modification. Id., at 648-650. Therefore, citing 
Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a con-
sent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated de-
cree, the Court reversed the denial of the Union's motion for 
modification. I d., at 650-652. 
Wright stands for the proposition that where one party to a 
consent decree is entitled to a modification because a subse-
quent change in the law has altered the legal framework 
within which a consent decree was originally negotiated, the 
other parties to the decree "have no power to require of the 
court continuing enforcement" of the injunction. I d., at 
652. 14 This result is consistent with Swift II and with there-
•• Cf. also, ibid. (emphasis added): 
"The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type 
of decree a court can properly grant~ne negotiated with all those 
strengths and infirmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact 
• 
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sult we reach today. There is dictum in Wright which sug-
gests that a court lacks power to approve a consent decree 
that contains anything not provided for in the law upon which 
the underlying complaint is based. That dictum, however, is 
contradicted in the opinion itself, which also contains lan-
guage suggesting that, in adopting a consent decree, the 
court is ordinarily free to accept or reject terms that are dif-
ferent from what is authorized by the statute. See id., at 
651. 15 In any event, the dictum in Wright is inconsistent 
with the many cases recognizing that parties may agree in a 
consent decree to relief broader than a court would otherwise 
be authorized to impose, supra, at--. Therefore, we de-
cline to give it controlling significance. 
IV 
Local 93 and the Solicitor General also challenge the valid-
ity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered 
without the consent of the Union. They take the position 
that ecause t e nion was permitted to intervene as of 
right, its consent was required before the court could ap-
prove a consent decree. This argument misconceives the 
Union's rights in the litigation. __. 
A ~rily a means by which parties set-
tle their disputes without having to bear the financial and 
other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that 
one party-whether an original party, a party that was 
joined later, or an intervenor-could preclude other parties 
from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing 
from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to 
present evidence· andhave its objectioiiSFleard at the' hear-
that the court will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a 
change in law or facts has made inequitable what was once equitable." 
15 "Frequently of course the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted 
without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is 
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objec-
tives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a 
change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives." 
-----
, .. ~· '• · .. 
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ings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not hg.ve 
pow~~~~ts_c~sent. 
See Z~pes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,-465 U.-s:-385; 392, 
400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional 
Services, 711 F. 2d 1117,1126 (CA21983), cert. denied, 465 
U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its 
opportunity to P.41rticimte in the District Court's hearings on 
the consent dec~ee. it was permitted to air its objections to 
the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant 
evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objec-
tions and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly, 
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it] 
was due .... " Zipes, supra, at 400. 
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through 
sett~t may not dispose of the claims of t ir arty, and 
a fortiori may not impose uties or obligations on a third 
party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval 
of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore 
cannot dispose of the valid claims of non-consenting interve-
nors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be liti-
gated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ~ 24.16[6], p. 181; see 
also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843, 
845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Prods. 
Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of 
course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes 
obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree. 
See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 
(1964); Hughes v. United States, supra; Ashley v. City of 
Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); 1B Moore ~ 0.409[5], p. 326, n. 2. How-
ever, the consent decree entered here does not bind Loc:Al 93 
to do or not to do anYthing. It imposes no legal duties or 
obligations on the Union at all; only the parties to the decree 
can be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with its 
terms. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S., at 
676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does not purport to 
•' 
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resolve any claims the Union might have under the Four-
teenth Amendment, see ~nt v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,-- U. S. -- (1986), § 703 of Title VII, see McDonald 
v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976); United 
Steelworkers v. Weber, supra, or as a matter of contract, see 
W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 756 , supra. Indeed, de-
spite the efforts of the District Judge to persuade it to do so, 
the Union failed to raise any substantive claims. Whether it 
is now too late to raise such claims, or-if not-whether the 
Union's claims have merit are questions that must be pre-
sente<ilrl tfie fi?stli1sranc~h has 
retaineajurisdict1on t"o earsuccaeng:es:e only issue 
beforeus is whether ~me District Court from 
approving this consent decree. We hold that it did not. 
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W>< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR . 
~~mu~cttricf~t~~~mu~ 
'cJII'asJri:n:ghttt. ~. ~· 20gtJ!.~ 
May 25, 1986 
Local 28 v. EEOC, No. 84-1656 
Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, No. 84-1999 
Dear Lewis: 
Enclosed, at long last, are draft opinions in these two 
cases. I am, of course, especially interested in any suggestions 
you might have on how to improve either of them. I apologize for 
the length of the opinion in Local 28, but it seemed to me 
necessary to lay out both the facts of the case and the 
legislative history of the statute in some detail in order 
properly to dispose of the issues presented. 
Sincerely, 
w98 ,Jr. l~k 
Justice Powell 
•' 
~u:vrtnu <l}ourt of tl{t ~b i\tatts 
'llhtelfington. ~. <!}. 2!Tp'!~ 
CHAM8ERS OF' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
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Re: No. 84-1999 - Local Numb r 93, International 
Association of Firefig te , AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. 
City of Cleveland, et al. 
Dear Bill: 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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Re: 84-1999 - Local 93, International 
Ass'n v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
.Justice Brennan 
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Copies to the Conference 
84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Bill: 
You have limited the issue in this case to 
whether a consent decree is an "order of the court" and 
therefore subject to the limits of §706(g) of Title VII. 
You conclude that a consent decree is not an order of the 
court. I will join your judgment and hope to join all of 
your opinion, except Part III. I do have a number of 
suggestions, primarily for the purpose of clarification. 
1. You rely on Weber and cite it several times. 
Weber has some relevance, but - as you note at p. 14 - it 
involved a private employer while this case involves a 
public employer subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Therefore, Weber does not answer one of the major issues 
left open in your opinion for remand. This could be made 
clear by inclusion of language along the following 1 ines 
(possibly on p. 14 where you are discussing Weber): 
"Of course, Weber involved a private employer, 
while this case involves a public employer 
subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As we explained infra, at 28-29, we 
leave the application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the underlying agreement for 
resolution on remand." 
There are a couple of places where I think that 
it would be helpful to emphasize that the City, even 
though not limited by §706 (g) in agreeing to a consent 
decree, is nevertheless limited in what it can agree to by 
other provisions of Title VII and by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I suggest the following additions: 
1. On p. 12, line 4, I suggest substituting "The 
Court holds" for "We hold." 
2. I suggest the folowing insert on p. 14, line 
7, or perhaps in a footnote on the same page: 
"This case, of course, involves a public employer 
whose voluntary actions are subject to the 
strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment as well 
as to the limitations of §703 of Title VII. In 
the posture in which this case comes to us, we 
have no occasion to address the circumstances, 
if any, in which voluntary action by a public 
employer that is permissible under §703 would 
nonetheless be barred by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Nor need we decide what limits §703 
places on an employer's ability to agree to 
race-conscious relief in a voluntary settlement 
that is not embed ied in a consent decree, or 
what showing the employer would be required to 
make concerning possible prior discrimination on 
its part against nonwhites in order to defeat a 
challenge by white employers based on §703. Cf. 
Wygant. In any event, there may be instances in 
which a public employer, consistent with both 
the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in 
Wygant and §703 as interpreted in Weber, could 
voluntarily agree to take race-conscious 
measures in pursuance of a legitimate remedial 
purpose. The only issue before us, therefore, 
is whether, assuming arguendo that §706(g) would 
bar a court from ordering such race-conscious 
relief after trial in some of these instances, 
§706(g) also bars a court from approving a 
consent decree entered into by the employer and 
providing for such relief." 
3. On p. 16, line 3, insert the following new 
paragraph: 
"Because this Court's cases do not treat consent 
decrees as judicial decrees in all respects and 
for all purposes, we think that the language of 
§706(g) does not so clearly include consent 
decrees as to preclude resort to the voluminous 
legislative history of Title VII. The issue is 
whether when Congress used the phrase "No order 
of the court shall require" in §706(g) it 
unmistakeably intended to refer to consent 
decrees. In addition to the fact that consent 
decrees have contractual as well as judicial 
features, the use of the verb "require" in 
§706(g) suggests that it was the coercive aspect 
of a judicial decree that Congress had in mind. 
We turn, therefore, to the legislative history, 
since the language of §706 (g) does not clearly 
settle the matter." 
4. I suggest deleting the first sentence of the 
paragraph on p. 17 and replacing it with the following: 
"The legislative history pertaining specifically 
to S706 (g) suggests that it was drafted with 
this concern in mind and, in fact, that a 
principal purpose of the last sentence of 
§706 (g) was to protect the managerial 
prerogatives of employers and unions." 
I also hope the citation to the discussion of the 
legislative history in Local 28 following this sentence 
will be deleted. 
5. The last sentence of the paragraph on p. 17, 
beginning "Thus, even if" should be changed to read: 
"Thus, whatever the extent of the limits §706(g) 
places on the power of federal courts to compel 
employers and unions to take certain actions 
that the employers or unions oppose and would 
not otherwise take, §706 (g) by itself does not 
restrict the ability of employers or unions to 
enter into voluntary agreements providing for 
race-conscious remedial action. The limits on 
such agreements must be found outside §706(g)." 
6. In the second sentence of footnote 9, after 
the word "latitude," could you insert the words "under 
Title VII"? 
7. In footnote 10, I suggest deleting the second 
sentence and replacing it with the following: "Section 
706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not employers or 
unions, and focuses on preserving certain management 
prerogatives from interference by the federal courts." At 
the end of the fourth sentence of footnote 10, replace the 
period with a comma, and add the words "and, in cases 
involving governmental employers, by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Then, following the citation to Weber, add a 
citation to Wygant. 
Part III, in addition to addressing Stotts, 
speaks rather broadly about consent decrees in general. 
You may be entirely right, but I would not be comfortable 
joining this section. 
In sum, subject to the changes I suggest, I will 
join your well written opinion except Part III. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
June 19, 1986 
84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Sandra: 
Here is a draft of a letter to Bill Brennan that 
incorporates suggested changes that 1 believe - if made -
would enable us to join all of Bi 11' s opinion except (in my 
case) Part 111. 
As the chanqe you want on p. 12, line 4, is not one 
that 1 would require, and the change on p. 16, line 3, is 
your idea, it occurs to me that perhaps this letter should 
come from you rather than me. 1 do not, however, object to 
these suggested changes, and so 1 am willing to send the 
entire letter as drafted - though 1 would be happy to defer 
to you. 
Of course, we could write separately, making clear 










..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
-~ v- ' r I 
.invrttttt Qf1tttrt ttf tqt 'Jnitth .§bdt.&' 
Jla,sftingtttn, ~. Of. 2ll~'!~ , 
June 19, 1986 
No. 84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Lewis, 
Your letter looks fine to me. I am perfectly 
willing to ask for the changes on p. 12 and p. 16 if 
you prefer. I am also willing to join a separate 
opinion stating we do not disagree with most of Bill's 
conclusions. I leave it to you. 
I note that on line 2, p. 3 of your letter, 




June 20, 1986 
84-1999 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland 
Dear Bill: 
You have limited the issue in this case to whether. 
a consent decree is an "order of the court• and therefore 
subject to the limits of S706(g) of Title Vll. You conclude 
that a consent decree is not an order of the court. 1 will 
join your judgment and hope to join all of your opinion, 
except Part 111. 1 do have a number of suggestions, primar-
ily for the purpose of clarification. 
1. You rely on Weber and cite it several times. 
Weber has some relevance, but - as you note at p. 14 - it 
involved a private employer while this case involves a pub-
lic employer subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. There-
fore, Weber does not answer one of the major issues left 
open in your opinion for remand. This could be made clear 
by inclusion of language along the following lines (possibly 
on p. 14 where you are discussing Weber): 
"Of course, Weber involved a private employ-
er, while this case involves a public employ-
er subject to the requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment. As we explained infra, at 
28-29, we leave the application of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the underlying agreement 
for resolution on remand." 
There are a couple of places where I think that it 
would be helpful to emphasize that the City, even though not 
limited by S706(g) in agreeing to a consent decree, is nev-
ertheless limited in what it can agree to by other provi-
sions of Title VII and by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 sug-
gest the following additions: 
2. On p. 12, line 4, 1 suggest substituting "The 
Court holds" for "We hold." 
t" J, 
' "' ' . ~~··~;~! .1/· 
,,. . ' . 
3. 1 suggest the folowing insert on p. 14, line 7, 




"This case, of course, involves a public em-
ployer whose voluntary actions are subject to 
the strictures of the fourteenth Amendment as 
well as to the limitations of S703 of Title 
Vll. ln the posture in which this case comes 
to us, we have no occasion to address the 
circumstances, if any, in which voluntary 
action by a public employer that is permissi-
ble under S703 would nonetheless be barred by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor need we decide 
what limits S703 places on an employer's 
ability to agree to race-conscious relief in 
a voluntary settlement that is not embodied 
in a consent decree, or what showing the em-
ployer would be required to make concerning 
possible prior discrimination on its part 
against nonwhites in order to defeat a chal-
lenge by white employees based on §703. Cf. 
Wygant. ln any event, there may be instances 
in which a public employer, consistent with 
both the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted 
in Wygant and S703 as interpreted in Weber, 
could voluntarily agree to take race-
conscious measures in pursuance of a legitt-
mate remedial purpose. The only issue before 
us, therefore, is whether, assuming arguendo 
that S706(g) would bar a court from ordering 
such race-conscious relief after trial in 
some of these instances, S706(g) also bars a 
court from approving a consent decree entered 
into by the employer and providing for such 
relief.• 
4. On p. 16, line 3, insert the following new para-
"Because this Court's cases do not treat 
consent decrees as judicial decrees in all 
respects and for all purposes, we think that 
the language of S706(g) does not so clearly 
include consent decrees as to preclude resort 
to the voluminous legislative history of 
Title Vll. The issue is whether when Con-
gress used the phrase "No order of the court 
shall require• in S706(g) it unmistakeably 
intended to refer to consent decrees. In 
addition to the fact that consent decrees 






tures, the use of the verb "require• in 
S706(g) suggests that it was the coercive 
aspect of a judicial decree that Congress had 
in mind. We turn, therefore, to the legisla-
tive history, since the language of S706(g) 
does not clearly settle the matter.• 
5. 1 suggest deleting the first sentence of the 
paragraph on p. 17 and replacing it with the following: 
"The legislative history pertaining spe-
cifically to S706(g) suggests that it was 
drafted with this concern in mind and, in 
fact, that a principal purpose of the last 
sentence of ~706(g) was to protect the mana-
gerial prerogatives of employers and unions.• 
1 also hope the citation to the discussion of the legisla-
tive history in Local 28 following this sentence will be 
deleted. 
6. The last sentence of the paragraph on p. 17, 
beginning "Thus, even if" should be changed to read: 
"Thus, whatever the extent of the limits 
S706(g) places on the power of federal courts 
to compel employers and unions to take cer-
tain actions that the employers or unions 
oppose and would not otherwise take, ~706(g) 
by itself does not restrict the ability of 
employers or unions to enter into voluntary 
agreements providing for race-conscious reme-
dial action. The limits on such agreements 
must be found outside S706(g) ." 
7. In the second sentence of footnote 9, after the 
word •latitude," could you insert the words •under Title 
Vll"? 
8. ln footnote 10, 1 suggest deleting the second 
sentence and replacing it with the followings •section 
706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not emplovers or 
unions, and focuses on preserving certain management prerog-
atives from interference by the federal courts.• At the end 
of the fourth sentence of footnote 10, replace the period 
with a comma, and add the words •and, in cases involving 
governmental employers, by the Fourteenth Amendment.• Then, 
following the citation to Weber, add a citation to Wygant. 
Part 111, in addition to addressing Stotts, speaks 
rather broadly about consent decrees in general. You may be 
-~~--~------------------------
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entirely right, but 1 would not be comfortable joining this 
section. 
ln sum, subject to the chanqes 1 suggest, 1 will 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ 
No. 84-1999 ~ ~ 
LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO 
C. L. C., PETITIONER v. CITY 
OF CLEVELAND ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U. S. C. §2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent de-
cree which provides relief that may benefit individuals who 
were not the actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory 
practices. 
I 
On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (the Van-
guards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters 
employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging 
the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred 
to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of 
race and national origin "in the hiring, assignment and pro-
motion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire De-
partment." App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a 
class of blacks and Hispanics consisting of firefighters already 
employed by the City, applicants for employment, and "all 
blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employ-
ment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire 
Department." I d., at 8. 
The Vanguards claimed that the City had violated the 
rights of the plaintiff class under the Thirteenth and 
-----r~l--tt( 
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Fourteeth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e 
et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although the com-
plaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and 
work assignments, the primary allegations charged that 
black and Hispanic firefighters "have ... been discriminated 
against by reason of their race and national origin in the 
awarding of promotions within the Fire Department." App. 
11. 1 The complaint averred that this discrimination was ef-
fectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City. 
The written examination used for making promotions was al-
leged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said 
to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the 
manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not 
be near the top of promotion lists when positions became 
available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority 
advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new 
promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the 
effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from 
certain litigation commenced in 1973. 
As just noted, the Vanguards' lawsuit was not the first in 
which the City had to defend itself against charges of race 
discrimination in hiring and promotion in its civil services. 
In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an action 
'The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the 
lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion 
Chief, Assistant Chief and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter 
must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written exami-
nation. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80% 
of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a 
place on a promotion eligibility list. Although rankings on the lists are 
based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis 
of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to 
remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year, 
and, as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full 2-year pe-
riod. Promotions are made from the lists as positions become available. 
~ •• # 
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alleging that the Police Department discriminated against 
minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City 
ofCleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District 
Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining 
certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing mi-
nority hiring goals. In 1977, these hiring goals were ad-
justed and promotion goals were established pursuant to a 
consent decree. Thereafter, litigation raising similar claims 
was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in 
a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a 
consent decree imposing hir-ing quotas similar to those or-
dered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of 
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio, Apr. 25, 1975). In 1977, 
after additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new 
plan governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department. 
By the time the Van guards filed their complaint, then, the 
City had already unsuccessfully contested many of the basic 
factual issues in other lawsuits. Naturally, this influenced 
the City's view of the Vanguards' case. As expressed by 
counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court: 
"(W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleve-
land had eight years at that point of litigating these 
types of cases, and eight years of having judges rule 
against the City of Cleveland. 
"You don't have to beat us on the head. We finally 
learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do 
to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city 
to comply with the law fully .... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 
41-42. 
Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litiga-
tion, the City entered into "serious settlement negotiations" 
with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980, 
from Edward R. Stege, Jr., and Mark I. Wallach to Hon. 
Thomas J. Lambros. 
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International 
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Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland's 
firefighters, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 24(a)(2) to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District 
Court granted the motion and ordered the Union to submit 
its complaint in intervention within 30 days. 
Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document 
entitled "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." Despite 
its title, this document did not allege any causes of action or 
assert any claims against either the Vanguards or the City. 
It expressed the view that "[p]romotions based upon any cri-
terion other than competence, such as a racial quota system, 
would deny those most capable from their promotions and 
would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from main-
taining the best possible fire fighting force," and asserted 
that "Local #93's interest is to maintain a well trained and 
properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends 
that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated 
competency, properly measured by competitive examinations 
administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of 
Federal, State, and Local laws." App. 27, 28. The "com-
plaint" concluded with a prayer for relief in the form of an in-
junction requiring the City to award promotions on the basis 
of such examinations. I d., at 28. 
In the meantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and 
the City continued, and a proposed consent decree was sub-
mitted to the District Court in November, 1981. This pro-
posal established "interim procedures" to be implemented "as 
a two-step temporary remedy" for past discrimination in pro-
motions. I d., at 33. The first step required that a fixed 
number of already planned promotions be reserved for minor-
ities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant, 
3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promo-
tions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to As-
sistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. I d., 
at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of 
"appropriate minority promotion goal[s]," id., at 34, for the 
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ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The pro-
posal also required the City to forgo using seniority points as 
a factor in making promotions. I d., at 32-33. The plan was 
to remain in effect for 9 years, and could be extended upon 
mutual application of the parties for an additional 6-year pe-
riod. I d., at 36. 
The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of 
January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent 
decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional 
goals and to the 9-year life of the decree. In addition, the 
Union protested the fact that it had not been included in the 
negotiations. This latter objection particularly troubled the 
District Judge. Indeed, although hearing evidence pre-
sented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the 
decree, the Judge stated that he was "appalled that these ne-
gotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the 
intervenors . . . , " and refused to pass on the decree under 
the circumstances. Tr. 134 (Jan. 7, 1982). Instead, he con-
cluded, "I am going to at this time to defer this proceeding 
until another day and I am mandating the City and the [Van-
guards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in 
dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their par-
ticular problems." Id., at 151. At the same time, Judge 
Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its 
objections more specific to accomplish anything: "I don't 
think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their posi-
tion on the basis that, 'Well, Judge, you know, there's some-
thing inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not 
fair.' We need more than that." Id., at 153. 
A second hearing was held on April 27. Local 93 contin-
ued to oppose any form of affirmative action. Witnesses for 
all parties testified concerning the proposed consent decree. 
The testimony revealed that, while the consent decree dealt 
only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned 
by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to 
make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to 
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hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battal-
ion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros 
proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high num-
ber of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The 
Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants 
rather than 40, it could "plug in a substantial number of black 
leadership that can start having some influence in the opera-
tion of this fire department" while still promoting the same 
nonminority officers who would have obtained promotions 
under the existing system. Tr. 147-148 (Apr. 27, 1982). 
Additional testimony revealed that this approach had led to 
the amicable resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Geor-
gia. Judge Lambros persuaded the parties to consider re-
vamping the consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta 
plan. The proceedings were therefore adjourned and the 
matter was referred to a United States Magistrate. 
Counsel for all three parties participated in 40 hours of in-
tensive negotiations under the Magistrate's supervision and 
agreed to a revised consent decree that incorporated a modi-
fied version of the Atlanta plan. See App. 79 (Report of 
Magistrate). However, submission of this proposal to the 
court was made contingent upon approval by the membership 
of Local 93. Despite the fact that the revised consent decree 
actually increased the number of supervisory positions avail-
able to nonminority firefighters, the Union members over-
whelmingly rejected the proposal. 2 
2 The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magis-
trate's Report to the District Court: 
"Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a 
touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable rec-
ommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union's Ex-
ecutive Board would be given serious consideration by the general mem-
bership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit, 
pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations, have again strained rela-
tions between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feel-
ings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped 
that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is 
· ..
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On January 11, 1983, the Vanguards and the City lodged a 
second amended consent decree with the court and moved for 
its approval. This proposal was "patterned very closely 
upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of 
[the] Magistrate ... ," App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus 
its central feature was the creation of many more promo-
tional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically, 
the decree required that the City immediately make 66 pro-
motions to Lieutenant, 32 -promotions to Captain, 16 promo-
tions to Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief. 
These promotions were to be based on a promotional exami-
nation that had been administered during the litigation. The 
66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split be-
tween minority and nonminority firefighters. However, 
since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level 
positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be 
promoted. The decree further required promotional exami-
nations to be administered in June 1984 and December 1985. 
Promotions from the lists produced by these examinations 
were to be made in accordance with specified promotional 
"goals" that were expressed in terms of percentages and 
were different for each rank. The list from the 1985 exami-
nation would remain in effect for two years, after which time 
the decree would expire. The life of the decree was thus 
shortened from nine years to four. In addition, except 
where necessary to implement specific requirements of the 
consent decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a 
factor in ranking candidates for promotion. I d. , at 
A29-A38. 
not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such 
reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together, 
without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals 
rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engag-
ing in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for 
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Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph 
16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning 
compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. ld., at 
A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdic-
tion with respect to applications or claims made by "any 
party, including Intervenor." ld., at A38. The decree im-
posed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93. 
On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the mem-
bers of the plaintiff class of the terms of the proposed decree. 
In addition, persons who wished to object to the proposal 
were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93 
filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent 
decree: 
"Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly main-
tained that there must be a more equitable, more fair, 
more just way to correct the problems caused by the 
[City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be 
unnecessary 'remedial' methods embodied in the law 
have been explored and some have been utilized. 
"Local #93 reiterates it's {sic] absolute and total ob-
jection to the use of racial quotas which must by their 
very nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire 
Service. Since this problem is obviously the concern of 
the collective representative of all members of the fire 
service, Intervenors, Local #93. {sic] We respectfully 
urge this court not to implement the 'remedial' provi-
sions of this Decree." App. 98. 
Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and 
necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still 
failed to assert any legal claims against either the Van guards 
or the City. 3 
3 In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced 
objections to the proposed consent decree in personal letters to the District 
Court. The basis of their objections was the same as the Union's. App. 
to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (Memorandum Opinion and 
Order of District Court). 
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The District Court approved the consent decree on J anu-
ary 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that "[t]he documents, 
statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April 
1982 hearings reveal a historical pattern of racial discrimina-
tion in the promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Depart-
ment." App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland 
A3-A4. He then observed: · 
"While the concerns articulated by Local 93 may be 
valid, the use of a quota system for the relatively short 
period of four years is not unreasonable in light of the 
demonstrated history of racial discrimination in promo-
tions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is 
neither unreasonable nor unfair to require non-minority 
firefighters who, although they committed no wrong, 
benefited from the effects of the discrimination to bear 
some of the burden of the remedy. Furthermore, the 
amended proposal is more reasonable and less burden-
some than the nine-year plan that had been proposed 
originally." !d., at A5. 
The Judge therefore overruled the Union's objection and 
adopted the consent decree "as a fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate resolution of the claims raised in this action." Ibid. 
The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for "all pur-
poses of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th(e] 
Decree upon the application of any party . . . . " App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A38. 
The Union appealed the overruling of its objections. A 
panel for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
one judge dissenting. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of 
Cleveland, 753 F. 2d 479 (1985). The court rejected the Un-
ion's claim that the use of race-conscious relief was "unrea-
sonable," finding such relief justified by the statistical evi-
dence presented to the District Court and the City's express 
admission that it had engaged in discrimination. The court 
also found that the consent decree was "fair and reasonable to 
non-minority firefighters," emphasizing the "relatively mod-
84-1999-0PINION 





est goals set forth in the plan," the fact that "the plan does 
not require the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters or 
the discharge of any non-minority firefighters," the fact that 
the plan "does not create an absolute bar to the advancement 
of non-minority employees," and the short duration of the 
plan. I d., at 485. 
After oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this 
Court decided Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984). 
"Concerned with the potential impact of Stotts," the Court of 
Appeals ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs, 
753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately concluded that Stotts 
did not affect the outcome of the case. The court noted that 
the District Court in Stotts had issued an injunction requiring 
layoffs over the objection of the City, while in this case the 
City of Cleveland had agreed to the plan. The court rea-
soned that even if Stotts holds that Title VII limits relief to 
those who have been actual victims of discrimination, "[t]he 
fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an in-
junction makes the legal basis of the Stotts decision inapplica-
ble." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 4 
Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The 
sole issue raised by the petition is whether the consent de-
cree is an impermissible remedy under § 706(g) of Title VII. 5 
• The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the 
injunction imposed by the District Court in that case "had the direct effect 
of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority 
workers," while "[i]n this case, the consent decree assured the integrity of 
the existing seniority system." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 
5 The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions: 
"1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting 
to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order 
as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial? 
"2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action 
promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected 
to represent all employees when said promotional scheme adversely affects 
the rights and interests of the employees and awards relief to minority em-
ployees regardless of whether they were actual victims of past racial 
discrimination?" 
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Local 93 argues that the consent decree disregards the 
express prohibition of the last sentence of § 706(g) that 
"[n]o order of the court shall require the admission or 
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or 
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual 
as an employee , or the payment to him of any back pay, 
if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or 
expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or 
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than 
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of 
this title." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). 
According to Local 93, this sentence precludes a court from 
awarding relief under Title VII that may benefit individuals 
who were not the actual victims of the employer's discrimina-
tion. The Union argues further that the plain language of 
the provision that "[n]o order of the court" shall provide such 
relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in 
addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the 
Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII 
litigation is invalid if-like the consent decree approved in 
this case-it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit indi-
viduals who are not themselves actual victims of an employ-
The first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes 
the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can con-
ceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect 
of the consent decree on petitioner's legal rights, neither the petition for 
certiorari nor. the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than 
whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII. 
Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent de-
cree was "reasonable," and then, after Stotts was decided, to whether the 
consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District 
Court's retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press what-
ever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at -. 
Therefore, we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether 
§ 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree. 
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er's discrimination. The Union is supported by the United 
States as amicus curiae. 6 
We granted the petition in order to answer this important 
question of federal law. 474 U. S. -- (1985). The Court I 
holds today in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, p. --, 
that courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief under 
Title VII that benefits individuals who were not the actual 
victims of a defendant's discriminatory practices. We need 
not decide whether this is one of those cases, however. For 
we hold that whether or not § 706(g) precludes a court from 
imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, 
that provision does not apply to relief awarded in a consent 
decree. 7 We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
II 
We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress 
intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means 
of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United 
States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CA8 
1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers "'to 
self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices 
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last ves-
tiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's 
history'"). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228 
(1982); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 
770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal Employ-
8 The United States took exactly the opposite position in Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for United States and EEOC in 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 0. T. 1978, Nos. 432, 435, and 436, pp. 26-38. 
' We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is 
intended to express a view as to the extent of a court's remedial power 
under§ 706(g) in cases where that provision does apply. That question is 
addressed in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, at-. 
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promul-
gated guidelines setting forth its understanding that "Con-
gress strongly encouraged employers . . . to act on a 
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems 
which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity 
.... " 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC: 
"The principle of nondiscrimination in employment be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and 
. the principle that each person subject to Title VII should 
take voluntary action to correct the effects of past dis-
crimination and to prevent present and future dis-
crimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually 
consistent and interdependent methods of addressing so-
cial and economic conditions which precipitated the en-
actment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to 
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be 
encouraged and protected in order to carry out the Con-
gressional intent embodied in Title VII." § 1608.1(c) 
(footnote omitted). 
It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to em-
ployers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination 
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits in-
dividuals who were not actual victims of discrimination. 
This was the holding of Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 
(1979). In Weber, an employer and a union agreed in collec-
tive bargaining to reserve for black employees 50% of the 
openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the per-
centage of black craftworkers in the plant was commensurate 
with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. After 
considering both the purposes of Title VII and its legislative 
history, we concluded that "[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law 
triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injus-
tice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been 
excluded from the American dream for so long' constituted 
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial seg-
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regation and hierarchy." /d., at 204 (citation omitted). Ac-
cordingly, we held that Title VII permits employers and 
unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable race-conscious 
affirmative action, although we left to another day the task of 
"defin[ing] in detail the line of demarcation between permissi-
ble and impermissible affirmative action plans." I d., at 208. 
Of course, Weber involved a purely private contractual 
agreement rather than a consent decree. But, at least at 
first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distin-
guish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and 
voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litiga-
tion.8 Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 
U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court's 
order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under 
28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines 
Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary set-
8 Unlike Weber, which involved a private employer, this case involves a 
public employer whose voluntary actions are subject to the strictures of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well as to the limitations of § 703 of Title VII. 
In the posture in which this case comes to us, we have no occasion to ad-
dress the circumstances, if any, in which voluntary action by a public em-
ployer that is permissible under § 703 would nonetheless be barred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, as is explained below, infra, at 28-30, 
we leave questions regarding the application of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the underlying agreement to further proceedings before the Dis-
trict Court. Nor need we decide what limits§ 703 places on an employer's 
ability to agree to race-conscious relief in a voluntary settlement that is not 
embodied in a consent decree, or what showing the employer would be re-
quired to make concerning possible prior discrimination on its part against 
minorities in order to defeat a challenge by nonminority employees based 
on § 703. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. --
(1986). In any event, there may be instances in which a public employer, 
consistent with both the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Wygant 
and§ 703 as interpreted in Weber, could voluntarily agree to take race-con-
scious measures in pursuance of a legitimate remedial purpose. The only 
issue before us is whether, assuming arguendo that § 706(g) would bar a 
court from ordering such race-conscious relief after trial in some of these 
instances, § 706(g) also bars a court from approving a consent decree en-
tered into by the employer and providing for such relief. 
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tlement of employment discrimination claims" under Title 
VII. Moreover, the EEOC's guidelines concerning "Affirm-
ative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964," 29 CFR pt. 1608 (1985), plainly contemplate the 
use of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary 
affirmative action. See, e. g., § 1608.8.9 True, these guide-
lines do not have the force oflaw, General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they '"constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' I d., at 142 
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no rea-
son to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermis-
sible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a con-
sent decree. 
Local 93 and the Solicitor General find a contrary indicator 
in § 706(g), which governs the courts' remedial power under 
Title VII. They contend that § 706(g) establishes an inde-
pendent limitation on what courts-as opposed to employers 
or unions-can do, prohibiting any "order of the court" from 
providing relief that may benefit nonvictims. They argue 
that a consent decree should be treated as an "order" within 
the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force 
and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely 
for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent de-
crees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as 
a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to mod-
ify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objec-
tion of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 
U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift II); third, lhat noncompliance 
9 The EEOC has not joined the Brief for United States in this case. 
The Solicitor General's brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney 
General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII, 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), and the Federal Government in its capacity 
as an employer, § 2000e-16. 
84-199~0PINION 
16 FIREFIGHTERS v. CLEVELAND 
with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt 
of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435, 
440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.). 
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of 
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, be-
cause their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement 
of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble con-
tracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
420 U. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour & 
Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we 
have previously recognized, consent decrees "have attributes 
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character 
that has resulted in different treatment for different pur-
poses. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether 
we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judg-
ment," for we can do both. The question is whether, given 
their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns 
embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating 
them as "orders" within the meaning of that provision. 
Because this Court's cases do not treat consent decrees as 
judicial decrees in all respects and for all purposes, we think 
that the language of § 706(g) does not so clearly include con-
sent decrees as to preclude resort to the voluminous legisla-
tive history of Title VII. The issue is whether, when Con-
gress used the phrase "[n]o order of the court shall require" 
in § 706(g), it unmistakably intended to refer to consent 
decrees. In addition to the fact that consent decrees have 
contractual as well as judicial features, the use of the verb 
"require" in § 706(g) suggests that it was the coercive aspect 
of a judicial decree that Congress had in mind. We turn 
therefore to the legislative history, since the language of 
§ 706(g) does not clearly settle the matter. 
The conclusion in Weber that "Congress chose not to forbid 
all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action" when it en-
acted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative his-
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tory, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned 
to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discre-
tion. Weber, 443 U. S., at 205-207. As originally enacted, 
Title VII regulated only private enterprises; the liberal Re-
publicans and Southern Democrats whose support was cru-
cial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings 
about the potential for Government intrusion into the mana-
gerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was 
necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. I d., at 206. 
Their votes were obtained only after they were given assur-
ances that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms 
are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." 
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. , pt. 2, p. 29 
(1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of 
Rep. Celler); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 
14314 (remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep. 
McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than 
seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more con-
servative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of 
power in 1964 "were far more concerned to avoid the intru-
sion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard 
would entail." Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65 
Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra, 
at 207-208, n. 7 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (1964) (re-
marks of Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating 
about "'preferential treatment or quotas in employment' " be-
cause it believed that "'the problems raised by these contro-
versial questions are more properly handled at a govern-
mental level- closer to the American people and by 
communities and individuals themselves'"). 
' 
The legislative history pertaining specifically to § 706(g) 
suggests that it was drafted with this concern in mind and, in 
fact, that a principle purpose of the last sentence of § 706(g) 
was to protect managerial prerogatives of employers and un-
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I ions. 10 See H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 
C. :J p. 11 (1963) (first version of § 706(g) preserving employer de-
fense of "cause"); 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964) (amending 
this version to substitute "for any reason other than dis-
crimination" in place of "cause"); id., at 2567 (remarks of 
Rep. Celler, the amendment's sponsor, that the amendment's 
purpose was "to specify cause"); id., at 6549 (remarks of Sen. 
Humphrey that § 706(g) makes clear "that employers may 
hire and fire, promote and refuse to promote for any reason, 
good or bad" except when such decisions violate the substan-
tive provisions of Title VII). Thus, whatever the extent of 
the limits § 706(g) places on the power of the federal courts to 
compel employers and unions to take certain actions that the 
employers or unions oppose and would not otherwise take, 
§ 706(g) by itself does not restrict the ability of employers or 
unions to enter into voluntary agreements providing for race-
conscious remedial action. The limits on such agreements 
must be found outside § 706(g). 11 
10 Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Although the 
legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the same con-
cern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental employers 
that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector, there is also no 
indication that Congress intended to leave governmental employers with 
less latitude under Title VII than had been left to employers in the private 
sector when Title VII was originally enacted. See generally, Subcommit-
tee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legis-
lative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972). 
f 11 Thus, we do not suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions 
is outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on non-minorities. 
We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail 
Transp . Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976), and Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 
193 (1979). Section 706(g), by its own terms, limits courts, not employers 
or unions , and focuses on preserving certain management prerogatives 
from interference by the federal courts. The rights of non-minorities with 
respect to action by their employers are delineated in § 703 of Title VII, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2, and, in cases involving governmental employees, by 
•" 
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From this, it is readily apparent that consent decrees are 
not included among the "orders" referred to in § 706(g), for 
the voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most funda-
mental characteristic. See United States v. ITT Continen-
tal Baking Co., 420 U. S., at 235-237; United States v. 
Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971); Hughes v. United 
States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); United States v. Atlantic Refin-
ing Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 
U. S. 900, 902 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari). As we observed in United States v. Armour 
& Co.: 
"Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case 
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on 
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to lit-
igate the issues involved in the case and thus save them-
selves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. 
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a 
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimi-
nation of risk, the parties each give up something they 
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation. 
Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; 
rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to 
each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much 
of those opposing purposes as the respective parties 
have the bargaining power and skill to achieve." 402 
U. S., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source 
of the court's authority to enter any judgment at all. See 
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (can-
not enter consent decree to which one party has not con-
sented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). More 
\ 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Weber, supra; Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 U. S. - (1986). 
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importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than 
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally 
based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent 
decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress 
placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose 
obligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of 
Title VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are 
created by a consent decree. 
The features of consent decrees designated by the Union 
and the Solicitor General do not require a contrary result. 
The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered 
after a trial obviously does not implicate Congress' concern 
with limiting the power of federal courts unilaterally to 
require employers or unions to make certain kinds of employ-
ment decisions. The same is true of the court's conditional 
power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an 
unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a 
consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations 
were created by agreement of the parties rather than im-
posed by the court. 12 Finally, we reject the argument that a 
consent decree should be treated as an "order" within the 
meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation 
for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative his-
tory that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obliga-
tion, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the 
focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement 
is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a col-
lective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent 
decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But 
the difference between contractual remedies and the con-
tempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with 
respect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement 
scheme--whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have 
'
2 However, as is discussed below, the court's exercise of the power to 
modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate 
§ 706(g). Infra, at - - - . 
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an agreement entered as a consent decree-is itself made vol-
untarily by the parties. 13 Thus, it does not implicate Con-
gress' concern that federal courts not impose unwanted ob-
ligations on employers and unions any more than the decision 
to institute race-conscious affirmative action in the first 
place; in both cases the parties have themselves created ob-
ligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutu-
ally satisfactory compromise. 
III 
Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984), 
and Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961), 
Local 93-again joined by the Solicitor General-contends 
that we have recognized as a general principle that a consent 
decree cannot provide greater relief than a court could have 
13 Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather 
than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator 
points out, "(p]ublic law settlements are often complicated documents de-
signed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-of-
court settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to 
continuing oversight and interpretation by the court." Schwarzschild, 
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fair-
ness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887, 899. In ad-
dition to this advantage, the National League of Cities adds: 
"A consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling 
litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it 
will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be 
shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court 
that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a 
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be 
easier to channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a 
consent decree into a single forum-the court that entered the decree-
thus avoiding the waste of resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflict-
ing obligations." Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Cu-
riae 25. 
For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become widely used as de-
vices to facilitate settlement. Indeed, we have little doubt that the inter-
pretation of§ 706(g) proposed by the Union and the Solicitor General would 
make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary 
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decreed after a trial. They urge that even if § 706(g) does 
not directly invalidate the consent decree, that decree is 
nonetheless void because the District Court "would have 
been powerless to order [such an injunction] under Title VII, 
had the matter actually gone to trial." Brief for Petitioner 
17. 
We conCluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent 
decree of race-conscious relief that may benefit nonvictims 
does not violate the congressional objectives of § 706(g). It 
is therefore hard to understand the basis for an independent 
judicial canon or "common law'' of consent decrees that would 
give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway. 
To be sure, a federal court is more than "a recorder of con-
tracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is "an 
organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions 
.... " 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal 
Practice ~ 0.409[5], p. 331 (1984) (hereinafter Moore). Ac-
cordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to re-
solve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, consistent with this requirement, the consent 
decree must "com[e] within the general scope of the case 
made by the pleadings," Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 
U. S. 289, 297 (1880), and must further the objectives of the 
law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CAlO 1979), cert. denied sub 
nom. Courtwright v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens 
for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 231 U. S. App. D. C. 
79, 87, 90, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (1983), cert. denied sub 
nom. Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 1219 (1984). However, in addition 
to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties' 
consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See 
Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better 
Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 89-90, 718 F. 2d, at 
1127-1128; Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of 
Compromise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 
<) • 
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(1959). Therefore, a federal court is not barred from enter-
ing a consent decree merely because the decree provides 
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a tr · . 
See, e. g., Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra, at 295-297; 
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928) 
(Swift 1) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a Better Environment v. 
Gorsuch, supra, at 89-91, 718 F. 2d, at 1127-1130; Sansom 
Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539 (CA3), cert. 
denied, 469 U. S. 1017 (1984); Turner v. Orr, 759 F. 2d 817, 
825-826 (CAS 1985). 14 
Local 93 argues that Railway Employees v. Wright and 
Firefighters v. Stotts establish a different rule. But those 
cases dealt with the modification of a consent decree over the 
objection of a party, not with the initial adoption of a decree 
at the parties' request. As one commentator has noted, 
moving from questions about the original decree to questions 
about its modification raises "entirely different consider-
ations-considerations that derive both from the historic role 
of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of in-
junctive relief itself." Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972) (hereinaf-
ter Handler). These considerations distinguish cases involv-
ing the court's power to make disputed modifications of a con-
sent decree. 
Courts have traditionally recognized that because "an in-
junction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing 
court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers 
and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that eq-
uitable relief," the court retains power to modify or vacate 
injunctions when necessary. Railway Employees v. Wright, 
364 U. S., at 647; Handler 24. Moreover, this power inheres 
"We do not hold that a federal court is required to approve such a con-
sent decree. We need not address here what grounds might justify a 
court's refusal to enter a consent decree in a particular case. 
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in the court's equitable authority whether an injunction was 
decreed by consent or after litigation: 
"Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very 
terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with 
its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted, 
power there still would be by force of principles inherent 
in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree 
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always 
to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The 
result is all one whether the decree has been entered 
after litigation or by consent. In either event, a court 
does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its man-
date if satisfied that what it has been doing has been 
turned through changing circumstances into an instru-
ment of wrong." Swift II, 286 U. S., at 114-115 (cita-
tions omitted). 
At the same time, countervailing policies of finality and res 
judicata have led to limitations on this power that insure its 
cautious exercise. Thus, in declining to modify a consent de-
cree entered between the Federal Government and numer-
ous meat-packing companies, Justice Cardozo stated: 
"There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of 
the inquiry proper to the case before us. We are not 
framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether 
anything has happened that will justify us now in chang-
ing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong, 
is not subject to impeachment in its application to the 
conditions that existed at its making. We are not at lib-
erty to reverse under the guise of readjusting. Life is 
never static, and the passing of a decade has brought 
changes to the grocery business as it has to every other. 
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so impor-
tant that dangers, once substantial have become attenu-
ated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be bet-
ter off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not 
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suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to jus-
tify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression. 
Nothing less than a clear showing of grevious wrong 
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us 
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with 
the consent of all concerned." !d., at 119. 
The party seeking modification of a consent decree thus 
must adduce evidence showing that circumstances are suffi-
ciently altered to justify changing the terms of the decree. 
See also, Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). If 
the movant meets this heavy burden, the court may make the 
modification even over the objection of other parties to the 
decree, resting continued imposition of legal restraint on the 
strength of the original consent because that initial agree-
ment necessarily required recognition of the court's power to 
modify. Swift II, supra, at 114. Nevertheless, completely 
new circumstances prevail with respect to the new term. As 
to that term there has never been an agreement among the 
parties, and it would put too much into their initial consent to 
suppose that it authorized the court to impose any and every 
particular form of relief that might seem appropriate to the 
court at some future date. Unable to rely on the parties' 
consent, the court must rely entirely on the underlying stat-
ute for authority with respect to the modified term. In 
other words, while the parties' original consent empowered 
the court to issue an injunction that incorporated broader re-
lief than could have been awarded after a trial, the absence of 
such consent in contested proceedings to modify the decree 
limits the court's remedial power to what is authorized by the 
statute upon which the claim was originally based. 
These principles both explain and distinguish the cases re-
lied upon by the Union. In Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 
561 (1984), the plaintiffs and the City of Memphis entered 
into a consent decree that included the use of racial prefer-
ences for hiring and promoting firefighters. After the de-
cree had been in effect for just over a year, budget deficits 
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forced Memphis to layoff a number of firemen. Because lay-
offs pursuant to Memphis' "last hired, first fired" rule would 
undo the gains made by minority firefighters under the de-
cree, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction requir-
ing Memphis to modify its seniority rules to protect new 
black employees. We reversed. We held first that the in-
junction could not be justified as necessary to enforce the 
terms of the consent decree. I d., at 572-576. The plaintiffs 
argued in the alternative that the injunction was a proper 
modification of the decree. We noted: 
"[A] district court cannot enter a disputed modification 
of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting 
order is inconsistent with that statute. 
"Thus, Title VII necessarily acted as a limit on the 
District Court's authority to modify the decree over the 
objections ofthe City . ... " !d., at 576, n. 9 (emphasis 
added). 
Because we concluded that the District Court would have 
been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such 
as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583, we re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument and held that "the District 
Court was precluded from granting such relief over the City's 
objection" by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577, 
n. 9. 
Railway Employees v. Wright, supra, also involved a dis-
puted modification of a consent decree. In that case, a rail-
road and the unions representing most of its employees were 
charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in 
violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 
The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among 
other things, the establishment of a union shop, a restriction 
that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time. 
When the Act was amended several years later to permit 
union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree; 
their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the rail-
road. This Court reversed the District Court's denial of this 
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motion, holding that refusal to modify constituted an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized 
that "a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification 
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, 
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance 
have changed, or new ones have arisen." 364 U. S., at 647. 
The Court explained that such changes may be so significant 
that not to modify the decree at the request of an aggrieved 
party would be an abuse of discretion, and also that refusal to 
modify an injunction was more likely to constitute an abuse of 
discretion "when the· new circumstances involve a change in 
law rather than facts." I d., at 648. In fact, based on these 
principles, the Court regarded as "established" the conclu-
sion that, had the decree before the Court represented relief 
awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion 
to deny modification. Id., at 648-650. Therefore, citing 
Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a con-
sent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated de-
cree, the Court reversed the denial of the Union's motion for 
modification. I d., at 650-652. 
Wright stands for the proposition that where one party to a 
consent decree is entitled to a modification because a subse-
quent change in the law has altered the legal framework 
within which a consent decree was originally negotiated, the 
other parties to the decree "have no power to require of the 
court continuing enforcement" of the injunction. I d., at 
652. 15 This result is consistent with Swift II and with the re-
sult we reach today. There is dictum in Wright which sug-
gests that a court lacks power to approve a consent decree 
that contains anything not provided for in the law upon which 
15 Cf. also 364 U. S., at 652 (emphasis added): 
"The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type 
of decree a court can properly grant-one with all those strengths and in-
firmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact that the court 
will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a change in law or 
facts has made inequitable what was once equitable." 
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the underlying complaint is based. That dictum, however, is 
contradicted in the opinion itself, which also contains lan-
guage suggesting that, in adopting a consent decree, the 
court is ordinarily free to accept or reject terms that are dif-
ferent from what is authorized by the statute. See 364 
U. S., at 651. 16 In any event, the dictum in Wright is incon-
sistent with the many cases recognizing that parties may 
agree in a consent decree to relief broader than a court would 
otherwise be authorized to impose, supra, at--. There-
fore, we decline to give it controlling significance. 
IV 
Local 93 and the Solicitor General also challenge the valid-
ity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered 
without the consent of the Union. They take the position 
that because the Union was permitted to intervene as of 
right, its consent was required before the court could ap-
prove a consent decree. This argument misconceives the 
Union's rights in the litigation. 
A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties set-
tle their disputes without having to bear the financial and 
other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that 
one party-whether an original party, a party that was 
joined later, or an intervenor-could preclude other parties 
from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing 
from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to 
present evidence and have its objections heard at the hear-
ings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have 
power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent. 
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines , Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392, 
400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional 
Services, 711 F. 2d 1117, 1126 (CA2 1983), cert. denied, 465 
•• "Frequently of course the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted 
without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is 
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objec-
tives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a 
change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives." 
84-1999--0PINION 
FIREFIGHTERS v. CLEVELAND 29 
U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its 
opportunity to participate in the District Court's hearings on 
the consent decree. It was permitted to air its objections to 
the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant 
evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objec-
tions and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly, 
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it] 
was due .... " Zipes, supra, at 400. 
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through 
settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and 
a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third 
party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval 
of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore 
cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting interve-
nors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be liti-
gated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ~24.16[6], p. 181; see 
also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843, 
845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Products 
Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of 
course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes 
obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree. 
See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 
(1964); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); Ashley 
v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); 1B Moore~ 0.409[5], p. 326, 
n. 2. However, the consent decree entered here does not 
bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything. It imposes no 
legal duties or obligations on the Union at all; only the parties 
to the decree can be held in contempt of court for failure to 
comply with its terms. See United States v. Armour & Co., 
402 U. S., at 676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does 
not purport to resolve any claims the Union might have 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 U. S. -- (1986), § 703 of Title VII, 
see McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 
(1976); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), or as a 
. ... 
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matter of contract, see W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Work-
ers, 461 U. S. 757 (1983). Indeed, despite the efforts of the 
District Judge to persuade it to do so, the Union failed to 
raise any substantive claims. Whether it is now too late to 
raise such claims, or-if not-whether the Union's claims 
have merit are questions that must be presented in the first 
instance to the District Court, which has retained jurisdiction 
to hear such challenges. The only issue before us is whether 
§ 706(g) barred the District Court from approving .this con-
sent decree. We hold that it did not. Therefore, the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed . 
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From: Justice Brennan 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1999 
LOCAL NUMBER 93, INTERNATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO 
C. L. C., PETITIONER v. CITY 
OF CLEVELAND ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether § 706(g) of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g), precludes the entry of a consent de-
cree which provides relief that may benefit md1v1duals who 
were nof1lleaCfua1v1ctims onne aerenaanrsCliscriminatory 
practiCes.-- · ---
' I 
On October 23, 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland (the Van-
guards), an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters 
employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a complaint charging 
the City and various municipal officials (hereinafter referred 
to collectively as the City) with discrimination on the basis of 
race and national origin "in the hiring, assignment and pro-
motion of firefighters within the City of Cleveland Fire De-
partment." App. 6. The Vanguards sued on behalf of a 
class of blacks and Hispanics consisting of firefighters already 
employed by the City, applicants for employment, and "all 
blacks and Hispanics who in the future will apply for employ-
ment or will be employed as firemen by the Cleveland Fire 
Department." I d., at 8. 
The Van guards claimed that the City had violated the 
rights of the plaintiff class under the Thirteenth and 
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Fourteeth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e 
et seq., and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Although the com-
plaint alleged facts to establish discrimination in hiring and 
work assignments, the primary allegations charged that 
black and Hispanic firefighters "have ... been discriminated 
against by reason of their race and national origin in the 
awarding of promotions within the Fire Department." App. 
11. 1 The complaint averred that this discrimination was ef-
fectuated by a number of intentional practices by the City. 
The written examination used for making promotions was al-
leged to be discriminatory. The effects of this test were said 
to be reinforced by the use of seniority points and by the 
manipulation of retirement dates so that minorities would not 
be near the top of promotion lists when positions became 
available. In addition, the City assertedly limited minority 
advancement by deliberately refusing to administer a new 
promotional examination after 1975, thus cancelling out the 
effects of increased minority hiring that had resulted from 
certain litigation commenced in 1973. 
As just noted, the Vanguards' lawsuit was not the first in 
which the City had to defund itsel against charges -of race 
dis~~imination -in -mr1ng-andprorrtotion in -its civil services. --·-- --,. In 1972, an organization of black police officers filed an action 
'The Cleveland Fire Department has six ranks of officers. From the 
lowest to the highest rank, these are: Lieutenant, Captain, Battalion 
Chief, Assistant Chief and Chief. To obtain a promotion, a firefighter 
must satisfy minimum experience requirements and pass a written exami-
nation. The examination is apparently quite difficult; approximately 80% 
of the applicants failed the 1984 promotional examination. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 28. Firefighters who pass the written examination are assigned a 
place on a promotion eligibility list. Although rankings on the lists are 
based primarily on test scores, additional points are assigned on the basis 
of seniority. There is a separate list for each rank. These lists are to 
remain effective for one year, but may be extended for an additional year, 
and, as a practical matter, lists are ordinarily used for the full 2-year pe-
riod. Promotions are made from the lists as positions become available. 
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alleging that the Police Department discriminated against 
minorities in hiring and promotions. See Shield Club v. City 
of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (ND Ohio 1972). The District 
Court found for the plaintiffs and issued an order enjoining 
certain hiring and promotion practices and establishing mi-
nority hiring goals. In 1977, these hiring goals were ad-
justed and promotion goals were established pursuant to a 
consent decree. Thereafter, litigation raising similar claims 
was commenced against the Fire Department and resulted in 
a judicial finding of unlawful discrimination and the entry of a 
consent decree imposing hiring quotas similar to those or-
dered in the Shield Club litigation. See Headen v. City of 
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (ND Ohio, Apr. 25, 1975). In 1977, 
after additional litigation, the Headen court approved a new 
plan governing hiring procedures in the Fire Department. 
By the time the Vanguards filed their complaint, then, the 
City had already l.!!J.Successfull contested many of the basic 
factu~uits. ~fftl"enced 
the City's view o!the Vanguards' case. As expressed by 
counsel for the City at oral argument in this Court: 
"[W]hen this case was filed in 1980, the City of Cleve-
land had eight years at that point of litigating these 
types of cases, and eight years of having judges rule 
against the City of Cleveland. 
"You don't have to beat us on the head. We finally 
learned what we had to do and what we had to try to do 
to comply with the law, and it was the intent of the city 
to comply with the law fully .... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 
41-42. 
Thus, rather than commence another round of futile litiga-
tion, the City entered into "serious settlement negotiations" 
with the Vanguards. See Letter dated December 24, 1980, 
from Edward R. Stege, Jr., and Mark I. Wallach to Hon. 
Thomas J. Lambros. . 
On April 27, 1981, Local Number 93 of the International 
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C. L. C. (Local 93 or 
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Union), which represents a majority of Cleveland's 
fire-tig-hters, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 24(a)(2) to intervene as a party-plaintiff. The District 
Court granted the~ and ordered the Union to submit 
its complaint in intervention within 30 days. 
Local 93 subsequently submitted a three-page document 
entitled "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." Despite 
its title, this document did not alle e any causes of action or 
assert an c a1ms agams e1 er the an ar s or the City. 
It expresse e v1ew hat "[p]romotions based upon any cri-
terion other than competence, such as a racial quota system, ~ ~ 
would deny those most capable from their promotions and 
would deny the residents of the City of Cleveland from main-
taining the best possible fire fighting force," and asserted 
that "Local #93's interest is to maintain a well trained and 
properly staffed fire fighting force and [Local 93] contends 
that promotions should be made on the basis of demonstrated 
competency, properly measured by competitive examinations 
administered in accordance with the applicable provisions of 
Federal, State, and Local laws." App. 27, 28. The "com-
plaint" concluded with a rayer for relief in_ the form of an in-
j~~on reqti!riiii~~-Jty to3._~~ on the basis ~ t rf.<... 
of such examinafwns. ICt:;a.t 28. .--- - __, 
In tlrenneantime, negotiations between the Vanguards and ~ 
the City continued, and a proposea consent decree was sub-
mitted to the District Court in November, 1981. This pro-
posal established "interim procedures" to be implemented "as 
a two-step temporary remedy" for past discrimination in pro-
motions. I d., at 33. The first step required that a fixed 
number of already planned promotions be reserved for minor-
ities: specifically, 16 of 40 planned promotions to Lieutenant, 
3 of 20 planned promotions to Captain, 2 of 10 planned promo-
tions to Battalion Chief, and 1 of 3 planned promotions to As-
sistant Chief were to be made to minority firefighters. I d., 
at 33-34. The second step involved the establishment of 
"appropriate minority promotion goal[s]," id., at 34, for the 
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ranks of Lieutenant, Captain, and Battalion Chief. The pro-
posal also required the City to forgo using seniority points as 
a factor in making promotions. I d., at 32-33. The plan was 
to remain in effect for 9 years, and could be extended upon 
mutual application of the parties for an additional 6-year pe-
riod. I d., at 36. 
The District Court held a 2-day hearing at the beginning of 
January to consider the fairness of this proposed consent 
decree. Local 93 objected to the use of minority promotional 
goals and to the 9-year 1 e o the decree. n a di wn, the 
Union proteste the act t at 1t had not been included in the 
negotiations. T 1s latter objection particularly troub ed the 
DistrietJudge. Indeed, although hearing evidence pre-
sented by the Vanguards and the City in support of the 
decree, the Judge stated that he was "appalled that these ne-
gotiations leading to this consent decree did not include the 
intervenors . . . , " and refused to pass on the decree under 
the circumstances. Tr. 134 (Jan. 7, 1982). Instead, he con-
cluded, "I am going to at this time to defer this proceeding 
until another day and I am mandating the City and the [Van-
guards] to engage the Fire Fighters in discussions, in 
dialogue. Let them know what is going on, hear their par-
ticular problems." I d., at 151. At the same time, Judge 
Lambros explained that the Union would have to make its 
objections more specific to accomplish anything: "I don't 
think the Fire Fighters are going to be able to win their posi-
tion on the basis that, 'Well, Judge, you know, there's some-
thing inherently wrong about quotas. You know, it's not 
fair.' We need more than that." Id., at 153. 
A second he i held o A il 7. Local 93 contin-
ued to ~~g_ID!-fu.!:m~~ion. Witnesses for 
all parties testified concerning the proposed consent decree. 
Tlie-testiiilOily revealed that, while the consent decree dealt 
only with the 40 promotions to Lieutenant already planned 
by the City, the Fire Department was actually authorized to 
make up to 66 offers; similarly, the City was in a position to 
., 
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hire 32 rather than 20 Captains and 14 rather than 10 Battal-
ion Chiefs. After hearing this testimony, Judge Lambros 
proposed as an alternative to have the City make a high num-
ber of promotions over a relatively short period of time. The 
Judge explained that if the City were to hire 66 Lieutenants 
rather than 40, it could "plug in a substantial number of black 
leadership that can start having some influence in the opera-
tion of this fire department" while still promoting the same 
nonminority officers who would have obtained promotions 
under the existing system. Tr. 147-148 (Apr. 27, 1982). 
Additional testimony revealed that this approach had led to 
the amicable resolution of similar litigation in Atlanta, Geor-
gia. Judge Lambros persuaded the parties to consider re- \ 
vamping the consent decree along the lines of the Atlanta 
plan. The proceedings were therefore adjourned and the 
matter was ref~:n:e4 to a United States Ma ·strate. 
Counsel for all three parties participated in 40 hours of in-
tensive negotiationsunaefthe Magistrate's supervision and 
agt"eed to revised consent d cree that incorporated a modi-
fied version of the Atlanta plan. See App. 79 (Report of 
Magistrate). H_~~er, submission o~_£!:OE2_~ to _!he 
court was made contingent upon approval bytheme-moership 
of Locaf93.'---ne-spitet1lel'actth~nt decree 
actually Increased the number of supervisory positions avail-
able to nonminority firefighters, the Union members over-
whelmingly rejected the proposal. 2 
2 The vote was 660 to 89. This rejection was anticipated in the Magis-
trate's Report to the District Court: 
"Acceptance by the general membership has always been recognized as a 
touch and go proposition. It was, however, believed that a favorable rec-
ommendation by Mr. Summers [counsel for the Union] and the Union's Ex-
ecutive Board would be given serious consideration by the general mem-
bership. Unfortunately, recent events having no bearing on this lawsuit, 
pertaining to the proposed closing of fire stations , have again strained rela-
tions between the firefighters and the City. Counsel fear that these feel-
ings may rebound in a negative vote on this issue. It can only be hoped 
that the general membership will realize that voting down this proposal is 
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On January 11, 1983, t e Vanguards and the cfty lodged a 
second amended consent d r~~d moved for 
its approval. This proposal was patterned very closely 
upon the revised decree negotiated under the supervision of 
[the] Magistrate ... ," App. to Pet. for Cert. A31, and thus 
its central feature was the creation of many more promo-
tional opportunities for firefighters of all races. Specifically, 
the decree required that the City immediately make 66 pro-
motions to Lieutenant, 32 promotions to Captain, 16 promo-
tions to Battalion Chief and 4 promotions to Assistant Chief. 
These promotions were to be based on a promotional exami-
nation that had been administered during the litigation. The 
66 initial promotions to Lieutenant were to be evenly split be-
tween minority and nonminority firefighters. However, 
since only 10 minorities had qualified for the 52 upper-level 
positions, the proposed decree provided that all 10 should be 
promoted. The decree further required promotional exami-
nations to be administered in June 1984 and December 1985. 
Promotions from the lists produced by these examinations 
were to be made in accordance with specified promotional 
"goals" that were expressed in terms of percentages and 
were different for each rank. The list from the 1985 exami-
nation would remain in effect for two years, after which time 
the decree would expire. The life of the decree was thus 
shortened from nine years to four. In addition, except 
where necessary to implement specific requirements of the 
consent decree, the use of seniority points was restored as a 
factor in ranking candidates for promotion. I d., at 
A29-A38. 
not a way of getting back at the City and that rejection based upon such 
reasoning will simply delay the day when firefighters can stand together, 
without regard to race, and pursue their common interests and goals 
rather than wasting available resources, financial or otherwise, by engag-
ing in intramural battles. Realistically, however, there is little room for 
optimism at this time." App. 78. 
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Local 93 was mentioned twice in the proposal. Paragraph 
16 required the City to submit progress reports concerning 
compliance to both the Union and the Vanguards. Id., at 
A36. In paragraph 24, the court reserved exclusive jurisdic-
tion with respect to applications or claims made by "any 
party, including Intervenor." Id., at A38. The decree im-
posed no legal duties or obligations on Local 93. 
On January 19, the City was ordered to notify the mem-
bers of the plaintiff class of the terms of the proposed decree. 
In addition, persons who wished to object to the proposal 
were ordered to submit their objections in writing. Local 93 
filed the following formal objection to the proposed consent 
decree: 
"Local #93 has consistently and steadfastly main-
tained that there must be a more equitable, more fair, 
more just way to correct the problems caused by the 
[City]. Many alternatives to the hopefully soon to be 
unnecessary 'remedial' methods embodied in the law 
have been explored and some have been utilized. 
"Local #93 reiterates it's [sic] absolute and total ob-
jection o e use o racial guotas which must y eir 
very nature cause serious racial polarization in the Fire 
Service. Since this problem is obviously the concern of 
the collective representative of all members of the fire 
service, Intervenors, Local #93. [sic] We respectfully 
urge this court not to implement the 'remedial' provi-
sions of this Decree." App. 98. 
Apart from thus expressing its opinion as to the wisdom and 
necessity of the proposed consent decree, the Union still 
failed to assert any legal claims against either the Vanguards 
or y. 3 
3 In addition to Local 93, three individual members of the Union voiced 
objections to the proposed consent decree in personal letters to the District 
Court. The basis of their objections was the same as the Union's. App. 
to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland A3 (Memorandum Opinion and 
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The District Court approved the consent decree on J anu-
ary 31, 1983. Judge Lambros found that "[t]he documents, 
statistics, and testimony presented at the January and April 
1982 hearings reveal a historical pattern of racial discrimina-
tion in the promotions in the City of Cleveland Fire Depart-
ment." App. to Brief in Opposition of City of Cleveland 
A3-A4. He then observed: 
"While the concerns" articulated by Local 93 may be 
valid, thEt use of a-q~~or the relatively short 
period of four years is not unreasonable in light of the 
demonstrated history~nation in promo-
tions in the City of Cleveland Fire Department. It is 
neither unreasonable nor unfair to require non-minority 
firefighters who, although they committed no wrong, 
benefited from the effects of the discrimination to bear 
some of the burden of the remedy. Furthermore, the 
amended proposal is more reasonable and less burden-
some than the nine-year plan that ~ad . been proposed 
originally." Id., at A5. ~ 
The Ju~_!E.~ef~e ~erruled the Union's objection and 
adopted-the consentaecree~nd ade-
quate resolution of the claims raised in this action." Ibid. 
The District Court retained exclusive jurisdiction for "all pur-
poses of enforcement, modification, or amendment of th[e] 
Decree upon the application of any party . . . . " App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A38. 
The Union appealed the overrulin of its objections. A 
panel for the -court o Appeals for the ixth ircuit affirmed, 
one judge dissenting. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of 
Cleveland, 753 F. 2d 479 (1985). The court rejected the Un-
ion's claim that the use of race-conscious relief was "unrea-
sonable," finding such relief justified by the statistical evi-
dence presented to the District Court and the City's express 
admission that it had engaged in discrimination. The court 
also found that the consent decree was "fair and reasonable to 
non-minority firefighters," emphasizing the "relatively mod-
84-1999---0PINION 
10 FIREFIGHTERS v. CLEVELAND 
est goals set forth in the plan," the fact that "the plan does 
not require the hiring of unqualified minority firefighters or 
the discharge of any non-minority firefighters," the fact that 
the plan "does not create an absolute bar to the advancement 
of non-minority employees," and the short duration of the 
plan. I d., at 485. 
Mter oral argument before the Court of Appeals, this 
Court 'decided Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984). 
"Concerned with the potential impact of Stotts," the Court of 
Appeals ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs, 
753 F. 2d, at 485-486, but ultimately concluded that Stotts 
did not affect the outcome of the case. The court noted that 
the District Court in Stotts had issued an injunction requiring 
layoffs over the objection of the City, while in this case the 
City of Cleveland had agreed to the plan. The court rea-
soned that even if Stotts holds that Title VII limits relief to 
those who have been actual victims of discrimination, "[t]he 
fact that this case involves a consent decree and not an in-
junction makes the legal basis of the Stotts decision inapplica-
ble." 753 F. 2d, at 486. 4 
Local 93 petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The 
sole issue raised b the petition is whether the consent de-
cree is an 1mpermiss1 e reme~er § 7Q6(gL_of Title VIJ.S 
___........____~-.-~ ---------.. 
• The Court of Appeals also distinguished Stotts on the ground that the 
injunction imposed by the District Court in that case "had the direct effect 
of abrogating a valid seniority system to the detriment of non-minority 
workers," while "[i]n this case, the consent decree assured the integrity of 
the existing seniority system." 753 F . 2d, at 486. 
5 The petition for certiorari sets forth two questions: 
"1. May a District Court adopt provisions in a consent decree purporting 
to remedy a Title VII violation that it would have had no authority to order 
as a remedy if the matter had gone to trial? 
"2. May a municipal employer voluntarily adopt an affirmative action 
promotional scheme over the objections of an intervenor union duly elected 
to represent all employees when said promotional scheme adversely affects 
the rights and interests of the employees and awards relief to minority em-
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Local 93 argues that ~h~onsent decree disregards the 
exp~i~~-l~st_~n~~~~~o~~ :o6.~g) tliat ~;; .u-? I~ 
"[ nLo -~ of the court shall reQ..JiJre the admission or 
reinsti:~nt of an individual as a memoer of a union, or 
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individwl 
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, 
jf such individual was refused admission, suspended, or 
expelled, or was ·refused employment or advancement or 
was suspended or discharged for any reason oth!!_r thp,n 
discrimination on account of ra:ce, color, religion, sex, 
or nationa10rlg1n orin violation of section 2000e-3(a) of 
this title." 42 U.S. C. §2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). 
According to Local 93, this sentence recludes a court from 
awarding relief under Title V t at may benefit individuals 
who were no~ of the emp~mina­
tion. - The Union argues further that the plain language of 
theProvision that "[n]o order of the court" shall provide such 
relief extends this limitation to orders entered by consent in 
addition to orders issued after litigation. Consequently, the 
Union concludes that a consent decree entered in Title VII 
litigation is invalid if-like the consent decree approved in 
this case--it utilizes racial preferences that may benefit indi-
viduals who are not themselves actual victims of an employ-
The first of these questions plainly asks only whether Title VII precludes 
the entry of this consent decree. Although the second question can con-
ceivably be read to embody a more general challenge respecting the effect 
of the consent decree on petitioner's legal rights, neither the petition for 
certiorari nor the brief on the merits discusses any issue other than 
whether this consent decree was prohibited by § 706(g) of Title VII. 
Moreover, petitioner limited its challenge below to whether the consent de-
cree was "reasonable," and then, after Stotts was decided, to whether the 
consent decree was permissible under § 706(g). Finally, the District 
Court's retention of jurisdiction leaves it open for petitioner to press what-
ever other claims it might have before that court, see infra, at --. 
Therefore, we deem it necessary to decide only the question whether 
§ 706(g) precluded the District Court from entering this consent decree. 
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er's discrimination. The Union is supported by the United 
States as amicus curiae. 6 
We granted the petition in order to answer this important 
questionOf1'eaeratlaW-:-' 474 U. S. -- (1985). WU!gld 
to~ay_.ig _ _.~'_~ee£.M_et~s_rs v. F}_§_QQ, ante, p. --, _Qlat 
courts may, in appropriate cases, provide relief under Title 
Viftliatbenefits individuals who were not the adual victims 
ofa defendant's discrimmator practices. r/W e need not de-
cide w ether t is 1s one of those cases, however~ £pr we } 
h0ldtllatwl1et~recludes a court from 1m-
posing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, that 
prov~~does not a 1 to relief awarded in a consent de-
cree. 7 We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
II 
We have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress 
intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means 
of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (quoting United 
States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F. 2d 354, 379 (CAS 
1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers "'to 
self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices 
and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last ves-
tiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's 
history"'). See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 364 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 228 
(1982); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 
770-771 (1983). This view is shared by the Equal Employ-
6 The United States took exactly the opposite position in Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979). See Brief for United States and EEOC in 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 0. T. 1978, Nos. 432, 435, and 436, pp. 26-38. 
'We emphasize that, in light of this holding, nothing we say here is 
intended to express a view as to the extent of a court's remedial power 
under§ 706(g) in cases where that provision does apply. That question is 
addressed in Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, at-. 
• 
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ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has promul-
gated guidelines setting forth its understanding that "Con-
gress strongly encouraged employers . . . to act on a 
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems 
which constituted barriers to equal employment opportunity 
.... " 29 CFR § 1608.1(b) (1985). According to the EEOC: 
"The principle of nondiscrimination in employment be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and 
the principle that each person subject to Title VII should 
tal}e voluntary action to correct the effects of past dis-
criminatio;'-·: na' to prevent present and future dis-
crimination without awaiting litigation, are mutually 
consistent and interdependent methods of addressing so-
cial and economic conditions which precipitated the en-
actment of Title VII. Voluntary affirmative action to 
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be 
encouraged and protected in order to carry out the Con-
gressional intent embodied in Title VII." § 1608.1(c) 
(footnote omitted). 
It is equally clear that the voluntary action available to em-
ployers and unions seeking to eradicate race discrimination 
may include reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits in-
dividuals who were not actual victims of discrimination. 
This was the holding of Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 
(1979). In Weber, an employer and a unToilagreed in collec-
tive bargaining to reserve for black employees 50% of the 
openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the per-
centage of black craftworkers in the plant was commensurate 
with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. After 
considering both the purposes of Title VII and its legislative 
history, we concluded that "(i]t ~o!}ic indeed if a law 
triggered by a Nation's concernovercentUrie'SO'fracutl injuS-
tice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been 
excluded from the American dream for so long' constituted 
the first legislative prohibition of all voluntar rivate, race-
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regation and hierarchy." I d., at 204 (citation omitted). Ac-
cordingly, we held that Title VII permits employers and 
unions voluntarily to make use of reasonable race-conscious 
affirmative action, although we left to another day the task of 
"defin[ing] in detail the line of demarcation between permissi-
ble and impermissible affirmative action plans." I d., at 208. 
Of course, Webe'C_inv_9..!_ved,__ a~_E!'iv~te _contractual ( l1frl-
agreement rather than a consent decree. - Bl:if,lifl:east at I 
first blush, there does not seem to be any reason to distin-
guish between voluntary action taken in a consent decree and 
voluntary action taken entirely outside the context of litiga-
tion. Indeed, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 
U. S. 79, 88, n. 14 (1981), we held that a District Court's 
order denying entry of a consent decree is appealable under 
28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1) because such an order undermines 
Congress' "strong preference for encouraging voluntary set-
tlement of employment discrimination claims" under Title 
VII. Moreover, the EEOC's guidelines concerning "Affirm-
ative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964," 29 CFR pt. 1608 (1985), plainly contemplate the 
use of consent decrees as an appropriate form of voluntary 
affirmative action. See, e. g., § 1608.8.8 True, these guide-
lines do not have the force oflaw, General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976), but still they "'constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' I d., at 142 
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
Therefore, absent some contrary indication, there is no rea-
son to think that voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
such as was held permissible in Weber is rendered impermis-
8 The EEOC has not joined the Brief for United States in this case. 
The Solicitor General's brief has been filed only on behalf of the Attorney 
General, who has some limited enforcement responsibility under Title VII, 
see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the Federal Government in its capacity 
as an employer, § 2000e-16. 
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sible by Title VII simply because it is incorporated into a con-
sent decree. 
Local 93 and the Solicitor General find a contrary indicator 
in § 706(g), which governs the courts' remedial power under 
Title VII. They contend that § 706(g) establishes an inde-
pendent limitation on what courts-as opposed to employers 
or unions-can do, prohibiting any "order of the court" from 
providing relief that may benefit nonvictims. They argue 
that a consent decree should be treated as an "order" within 
the meaning of § 706(g) because it possesses the legal force 
and character of a judgment decreed after a trial. They rely 
for this conclusion on several characteristics of consent de-
crees: first, that a consent decree looks like and is entered as 
a judgment; second, that the court retains the power to mod-
ify a consent decree in certain circumstances over the objec-
tion of a signatory, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 
U. S. 106, 114 (1932) (Swift II); third, that noncompliance 
with a consent decree is enforceable by citation for contempt 
of court, see United States v. City of Miami, 664 F. 2d 435, 
440, and n. 8 (CA5 1981) (opinion of Rubin, J.). 
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of 
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, be-
cause their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement 
of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble con-
tracts. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
420 U. S. 223, 235-237 (1975); United States v. Armour & 
Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971). More accurately, then, as we 
have previously recognized, consent decrees "have attributes 
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character 
that has resulted in different treatment for different pur-
poses. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
supra, at 235-237, and n. 10. The question is not whether 
we can label a consent decree as a "contract" or a "judg-
ment," for we can do both. The question is whether, given 
their hybrid nature, consent decrees implicate the concerns 
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embodied in § 706(g) in such a way as to require treating 
them as "orders" within the meaning of that provision. 
The conclusion in Weber that "Congress chose not to forbid 
all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action" when it en-
acted Title VII was largely based upon the legislative his-
tory, which shows that Congress was particularly concerned 
to avoid undue federal interference with managerial discre-
tion. Weber, 443 U. S., at 205-207. As originally enacted, 
Title VII regulated only private enterprises; the liberal Re-
publicans and Southern Democrats whose support was cru-
cial to obtaining passage of the bill expressed misgivings 
about the potential for Government intrusion into the mana-
gerial decisions of employers and unions beyond what was 
necessary to eradicate unlawful discrimination. I d., at 206. 
Their votes were obtained only after they were given assur-
ances that "management prerogatives, and union freedoms 
are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." 
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 
(1963). See also, 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of 
Rep. Geller); id., at 11471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 
14314 (remarks of Sen. Miller); id., at 15893 (remarks of Rep. 
McCulloch). As one commentator points out, rather than 
seeking to outlaw voluntary affirmative action, the more con-
servative proponents of Title VII who held the balance of 
power in 1964 "were far more concerned to avoid the intru-
sion into business autonomy that a rigid color-blind standard 
would entail." Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65 
Va. L. Rev. 729, 771, n. 224 (1979). See also, Weber, supra, 
at 207-208, n. 7 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 15893 (1964) (re-
marks of Rep. MacGregor)) (Congress was not legislating 
about "'preferential treatment or quotas in employment'" be-
cause it believed that "'the problems raised by these contro-
versial questions are more properly handled at a govern-
mental level closer to the American people and by 
communities and individuals themselves'"). 
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The legislative histo~~@_l!i~sp~i~Jy_ to § 706(g) 
suggests that it~fted with fliis concern in m~in 
fact, that Congress added the last sentence of § 706(g) specifi-
cally to protect managerial prerogatives of employers and un-
ions.9 See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, ante, at ~ 
----- (discussing the legislative history). See also, ~"'tJ .Lo 
H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 11 (1963) VL£ .... J~r 
(first version of § 706(g) preserving employer defense of ,,_, <~'.....--. 
"cause"); 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964) (amending this  
version to substitute "for any reason other than discrimina- ~A..~ 
tion" in place of "cause"); id., at 2567 (remarks of Rep. Celler, ~ , .. . }; I.M 
the amendment's sponsor, that the amendment's purpose wa~~ ~~~~ 
"to specify cause"); id., at 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey ol.  
that § 706(g) makes clear "that employers may hire and fire, 
promote and refuse to promote for any reason, good or bad" 
except when such decisions violate the substantive provisions 
of Title VII). Thus, even if the last sentence of§ 706(g) do~s 
limit the power of federal courts to compel employers and un-
ions to take certain actions that the employers or unions op-
pose and would not otherwise take, § 7~n- ( 
cern~_9-.l?~~.~~tion 
of employers or unions. '0 -- ___ _.:.......--.... _,.....- ·,--....._.-,_,..-
9 Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Although the 
legislative history of the 1972 amendments does not reflect the same con-
cern with preserving the managerial discretion of governmental employers 
that was evident in 1964 with respect to the private sector, there is also no 
indication that Congress intended to leave governmental employers with 
less latitude than had been left to employers in the private sector when 
Title VII was originally enacted. See generally, Subcommittee on Labor 
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(Comm. Print 1972). 
10 This is not to suggest that voluntary action by employers or unions is 
outside the ambit of Title VII regardless of its effect on non-minorities. 
We already rejected such arguments in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976), and Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 
193 (1979). We hold only that such concerns were not the source of 
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From this, it is readily apparent th_~consent aecre-e~ are 
not included among thenor ers" referre~®, fOr 
·- -----"\~. .. ------------ --the voluntary nature of a consent decree is its most funda-
mental cna_ric eristfc. ~ v. IT Corilinen-
tal Baking Co., 420 U. S., at 235-237; United States v. 
Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971); Hughes v. United 
States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); United States v. Atlantic Refin-
ing Co., 360 U. S. 19 ~1959); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 
U. S. 900, 902 (1983)~REHNQUIST, J., dissenti~ denial 
of certiorari). As we observed in United States v. Armour 
& Co.: 
"Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case 
after careful .E~~1atfon as produce agreement on 
their precise terms. The parties waive their right to lit-
igate the issues involved in the case and thus save them-
selves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. 
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a 
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimi-
nation of risk, the parties each give up something they 
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation. 
Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have aJ>urpose; 
rather the ~ arties have ur oses, generally opposed to 
each other, and t e resultant decree embodies as much 
of those opposing purposes as the respective parties 
have the bargaining power and skill to achieve." 402 
U. S., at 681-682 (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source 
of the court's authority to enter any judgment at all. See 
United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 (1964) (can-
not enter consent decree to which one party has not con-
sented); Ashley v. City of Jackson, supra, at 902 (REHN-
§ 706(g), which focuses on preserving certain management perogatives 
from interference by the federal courts. The rights of non-minorities with 
respect to action by their employers are delineated in§ 703 of Title VII, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2. See Weber, supra. 
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QUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). More 
importantly, it is the agreement of the parties, rather than 
the force of the law upon which the complaint was originally 
based, that creates the obligations embodied in a consent 
decree. Consequently, whatever the limitations Congress 
placed in § 706(g) on the power of federal courts to impose 
obligations on employers or unions to remedy violations of 
Title VII, these simply do not apply when the obligations are 
created by a consent decree. 
The features of consent decrees designated by the Union 
and the SOIIci'fO~t require a contrary result. 
The fact that a consent decree looks like a judgment entered 
after a trial obviously does notimplicate Con- essr concern 
~wer o e eral co~ to 
require emp oyers or unions to make certain kinds of employ-
me~ns. The same iSTrUeOfthec ou"ii'sc onditional 
power to modify a consent decree; the mere existence of an 
unexercised power to modify the obligations contained in a 
consent decree does not alter the fact that those obligations 
were created by agreement of the parties rather than im-
posed by the court. 11 Finally, we reject the argument that a 
consent decree should be treated as an "order" within the 
meaning of § 706(g) because it can be enforced by a citation 
for contempt. There is no indication in the legislative his-
tory that the availability of judicial enforcement of an obliga-
tion, rather than the creation of the obligation itself, was the 
focus of congressional concern. In fact, judicial enforcement 
is available whether race-conscious relief is provided in a col-
lective-bargaining agreement (as in Weber) or in a consent 
decree; only the form of that enforcement is different. But 
the difference between contractual remedies and the con-
tempt power is not significant in any relevant sense with 
respect to § 706(g). For the choice of an enforcement 
"However, as is discussed below, the court's exercise of the power to 
modify the decree over the objection of a party to the decree does implicate 
§ 706(g). Infra, at---. 
? 
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scheme-whether to rely on contractual remedies or to have 
an agreement entered as a consent decree-is itself made vol-
untarily by the parties. 12 Thus, it does not implicate Con-
gress' concern that federal courts not impose unwanted ob-
ligations on employers and unions any more than the decision 
to institute race-conscious affirmative action in the first 
place; in both cases the parties have themselves created ob-
ligations and surrendered claims in order to achieve a mutu-
ally satisfactory compromise. 
III 
Relying upon Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984), 
and Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961), 
Local 93--again joined by the Solicitor General-contends 
that we have recognized as a general principle that a consent 
'
2 Parties may choose to settle their disputes by consent decree rather 
than by private contract for a number of reasons. As one commentator 
points out, "[p]ublic law settlements are often complicated documents de-
signed to be carried out over a period of years, ... so any purely out-of-
court settlement would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to 
continuing oversight and interpretation by the court." Schwarzschild, 
Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fair-
ness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L. J. 887,899. In ad-
dition to this advantage, the National League of Cities adds: 
"A consent decree has several other advantages as a means of settling 
litigation. It is easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree because it 
will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise have to be 
shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary contract. A court 
that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a 
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be 
easier to channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a 
consent decree into a single forum-the court that entered the decree-
thus avoiding the waste of resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflict-
ing obligations." Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amicus Cu-
riae 25. 
For all of these reasons, consent decrees have become widely used as de-
vices to facilitate settlement. Indeed, we have little doubt that the inter-
pretation of§ 706(g) proposed by the Union and the Solicitor General would 
make it substantially more difficult to settle Title VII litigation, contrary 
to the expressed congressional preference for voluntary remedial action. 
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decree cannot provide greater relief than a court could have 
decreed after a trial. They urge that even if § 706(g) does 
not directly invalidate the consent decree, that decree is 
nonetheless void because the District Court "would have 
been powerless to order [such an injunction] under Title VII, 
had the matter actually gone to trial." Brief for Petitioner 
17. 
We concluded above that voluntary adoption in a consent 
decree of race-conscious relief that may benefit nonvictims 
does not violate the congressional objectives of § 706(g). It 
is therefore hard to understand the basis for an independent 
judicial canon or "common law" of consent decrees that would 
give § 706(g) the effect of prohibiting such decrees anyway. 
To be sure, a federal court is more than "a recorder of con-
tracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is "an 
organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions 
.... " 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal 
Practice 11 0.409[5], p. 331 (1984) (hereinafter Moore). Ac-
cordingly, a consent decree must spring from and serve to re-
solve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, consistent with this requirement, the consent 
decree must "com[e] within the general scope of the case 
made by the pleadings," Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 
U. S. 289, 297 (1880), and must further the objectives of the 
law upon which the complaint was based, EEOC v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 611 F. 2d 795, 799 (CAlO 1979), cert. denied sub 
nom. Courtwright v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 952 (1980); Citizens 
for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 231 U. S. App. D. C. 
79, 87, 90, 718 F. 2d 1117, 1125, 1128 (1983), cert. denied sub 
nom. Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 1219 (1984). However, in addition 
to the law which forms the basis of the claim, the parties' 
consent animates the legal force of a consent decree. See 
Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra; Citizens for a Better 
Environment v. Gorsuch, supra, at 89-90, 718 F. 2d, at 
1127-1128; Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of 
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Compromise and Settlement, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 
(1959). Therefore, a federal court is not barred from enter-
ing a consent decree merely because the decree provides 
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial. 
See, e. g., Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum, supra, at 295-297; 
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 327-331 (1928) 
(Swift 1) (Brandeis, J.); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
supra, at 799-800; Citizens for a Better Environment v. 
Gorsuch, supra, at 89-91, 718 F. 2d, at 1127-1130; Sansom 
Committee v. Lynn, 735 F. 2d 1535, 1538-1539 (CA3), cert. 
denied, 469 U. S. 1017 (1984); Turner v. Orr, 759 F. 2d 817, 
825-826 (CA8 1985). 13 
Local 93 argues that Railway Employees v. Wright and 
Firefighters v. Stotts establish a different rule. But those 
cases dealt with the modification of a consent decree over the 
objection of a party, not with the initial adoption of a decree 
at the parties' request. As one commentator has noted, 
moving from questions about the original decree to questions 
about its modification raises "entirely different consider-
ations-considerations that derive both from the historic role 
of the Courts of Chancery and from the unique nature of in-
junctive relief itself." Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1972) (hereinaf-
ter Handler). These considerations distinguish cases involv-
ing the court's power to make disputed modifications of a con-
sent decree. 
Courts have traditionally recognized that because "an in-
junction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing 
court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers 
and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that eq-
uitable relief," the court retains power to modify or vacate 
injunctions when necessary. Railway Employees v. Wright, 
364 U. S., at 647; Handler 24. Moreover, this power inheres 
13 We do not hold that a federal court is required to approve such a con-
sent decree. We need not address here what grounds might justify a 
court's refusal to enter a consent decree in a particular case. 
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in the court's equitable authority whether an injunction was 
decreed by consent or after litigation: 
"Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very 
terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with 
its restraints. If the reservation had been omitted, 
power there still would be by force of principles inherent 
in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree 
of injunction directed to events to come is subject always 
to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The 
result is all one whether the decree has been entered 
after litigation or by consent. In either event, a court 
does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its man-
date if satisfied that what it has been doing has been 
turned through changing circumstances into an instru-
ment of wrong." Swift II, 286 U. S., at 114-115 (cita-
tions omitted). 
At the same time, countervailing policies of finality and res 
judicata have led to limitations on this power that insure its 
cautious exercise. Thus, in declining to modify a consent de-
cree entered between the Federal Government and numer-
ous meat-packing companies, Justice Cardozo stated: 
"There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of 
the inquiry proper to the case before us. We are not 
framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether 
anything has happened that will justify us now in chang-
ing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong, 
is not subject to impeachment in its application to the 
conditions that existed at its making. We are not at lib-
erty to reverse under the guise of readjusting. Life is 
never static, and the passing of a decade has brought 
changes to the grocery business as it has to every other. 
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so impor-
tant that dangers, once substantial have become attenu-
ated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be bet-
ter off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not 
24 
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suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to jus-
tify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression. 
Nothing less than a clear showing of grevious wrong 
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us 
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with 
the consent of all concerned." I d., at 119. 
The party seeking modification of a consent decree thus 
must adduce evidence showing that circumstances are suffi-
ciently altered to justify changing the terms of the decree. 
See also, Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). If 
the movant meets this heavy burden, the court may make the 
modification even over the objection of other parties to the 
decree, resting continued imposition of legal restraint on the 
strength of the original consent because that initial agree-
ment necessarily required recognition of the court's power to 
modify. Swift II, supra, at 114. Nevertheless, completely 
new circumstances prevail with respect to the new term. As 
to that term there has never been an agreement among the 
parties, and it would put too much into their initial consent to 
suppose that it authorized the court to impose any and every 
particular form of relief that might seem appropriate to the 
court at some future date. Unable to rely on the parties' 
consent, the court must rely entirely on the underlying stat-
ute for authority with respect to the modified term. In 
other words, while the parties' original consent empowered 
the court to issue an injunction that incorporated broader re-
lief than could have been awarded after a trial, the absence of 
such consent in contested proceedings to modify the decree 
limits the court's remedial power to what is authorized by the 
statute upon which the claim was originally based. 
These principles both explain and distinguish the cases re-
lied upon by the Union. In Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 
561 (1984), the plaintiffs and the City of Memphis entered 
into a consent decree that included the use of racial prefer-
ences for hiring and promoting firefighters. After the de-
cree had been in effect for just over a year, budget deficits 
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forced Memphis to layoff a number of firemen. Because lay-
offs pursuant to Memphis' "last hired, first fired" rule would 
undo the gains made by minority firefighters under the de-
cree, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction requir-
ing Memphis to modify its seniority rules to protect new 
black employees. We reversed. We held first that the in-
junction could not be justified as necessary to enforce the 
terms of the consent decree. I d., at 572-576. The plaintiffs 
argued in the alternative that the injunction was a proper 
modification of the decree. We noted: 
"(A] district court cannot enter a disputed modification 
of a consent decree in Title VII litigation if the resulting 
order is inconsistent with that statute. 
"Thus, Title VII necessarily acted as a limit on the 
District Court's authority to modify the decree over the 
objections ofthe City . ... " Id., at 576, n. 9 (emphasis 
added). 
Because we concluded that the District Court would have 
been precluded by Title VII from issuing an injunction such 
as the one it had issued after a trial, id., at 577-583, we re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument and held that "the District 
Court was precluded from granting such relief over the City's 
objection" by modifying the consent decree, id., at 576-577, 
n. 9. 
Railway Employees v. Wright, supra, also involved a dis-
puted modification of a consent decree. In that case, a rail-
road and the unions representing most of its employees were 
charged with discriminating against nonunion employees in 
violation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 
The parties entered a consent decree that prohibited, among 
other things, the establishment of a union shop, a restriction 
that was also contained in the Railway Labor Act at the time. 
When the Act was amended several years later to permit 
union shops, the unions moved to modify the consent decree; 
their motion was opposed by the plaintiffs and by the rail-
road. This Court reversed the District Court's denial of this 
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motion, holding that refusal to modify constituted an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances. The Court recognized 
that "a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification 
of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, 
whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance 
have changed, or new ones have arisen." 364 U. S., at 647. 
The Court explained that such changes may be so significant 
that not to modify the decree at the request of an aggrieved 
party would be an abuse of discretion, and also that refusal to 
modify an injunction was more likely to constitute an abuse of 
discretion "when the new circumstances involve a change in 
law rather than facts." I d., at 648. In fact, based on these 
principles, the Court regarded as "established" the conclu-
sion that, had the decree before the Court represented relief 
awarded after trial, it would have been an abuse of discretion 
to deny modification. I d., at 648-650. Therefore, citing 
Swift II for the proposition that the power to modify a con-
sent decree is the same as the power to modify a litigated de-
cree, the Court reversed the denial of the Union's motion for 
modification. I d., at 650-652. 
Wright stands for the proposition that where one party to a 
consent decree is entitled to a modification because a subse-
quent change in the law has altered the legal framework 
within which a consent decree was originally negotiated, the 
other parties to the decree "have no power to require of the 
court continuing enforcement" of the injunction. I d., at 
652. 14 This result is consistent with Swift II and with the re-
sult we reach today. There is dictum in Wright which sug-
gests that a court lacks power to approve a consent decree 
that contains anything not provided for in the law upon which 
14 Cf. also 364 U. S. , at 652 (emphasis added): 
"The type of decree the parties bargained for is the same as the only type 
of decree a court can properly grant--{)ne with all those strengths and in-
firmities of any litigated decree which arise out of the fact that the court 
will not continue to exercise its powers thereunder when a change in law or 
facts has made inequitable what was once equitable." 
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the underlying complaint is based. That dictum, however, is 
contradicted in the opinion itself, which also contains lan-
guage suggesting that, in adopting a consent decree, the 
court is ordinarily free to accept or reject terms that are dif-
ferent from what is authorized by the statute. See 364 
U. S., at 651. 15 In any event, the dictum in Wright is incon-
sistent with the many cases recognizing that parties may 
agree in a consent decree to relief broader than a court would 
otherwise be authorized to impose, supra, at --. There-
fore, we decline to give it controlling significance. 
IV 
Local 93 and the Solicitor General also challenge the valid-
ity of the consent decree on the ground that it was entered 
without the consent of the Union. They take the position 
that because the Union was permitted to intervene as of 
right, its consent was required before the court could ap-
prove a consent decree. This argument misconceives the 
Union's rights in the litigation. 
A consent decree is primarily a means by which parties set-
tle their disputes without having to bear the financial and 
other costs of litigating. It has never been supposed that 
one party-whether an original party, a party that was 
joined later, or an intervenor-could preclude other parties 
from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing 
from litigation. Thus, while an intervenor is entitled to 
present evidence and have its objections heard at the hear-
ings on whether to approve a consent decree, it does not have 
power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent. 
See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392, 
400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional 
Services, 711 F. 2d 1117, 1126 (CA2 1983), cert. denied, 465 
'
5 "Frequently of course the terms arrived at by the parties are accepted 
without change by the adopting court. But just as the adopting court is 
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objec-
tives, so must it be free to modify the terms of a consent decree when a 
change in law brings those terms in conflict with statutory objectives." 
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U. S. 1005 (1984). Here, Local 93 took full advantage of its 
opportunity to participate in the District Court's hearings on 
the consent decree. It was permitted to air its objections to 
the reasonableness of the decree and to introduce relevant 
evidence; the District Court carefully considered these objec-
tions and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly, 
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it] 
was due .... " Zipes, supra, at 400. 
Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through 
settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and 
a fortiori may not impose duties or obligations on a third 
party, without that party's agreement. A court's approval 
of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore 
cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting interve-
nors; if properly raised, these claims remain and may be liti-
gated by the intervenor. 3B Moore ~24.16[6], p. 181; see 
also, United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843, 
845-846 (CA3 1979); Wheeler v. American Home Products 
Corp., 563 F. 2d 1233, 1237-1238 (CA5 1977). And, of 
course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes 
obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree. 
See, e. g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U. S. 327 
(1964); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); Ashley 
v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S., at 902 (REHNQUIST, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); 1B Moore~ 0.409[5], p. 326, 
n. 2. However, the consent decree entered here does not 
bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything. It imposes no 
legal duties or obligations on the Union at all; only the parties 
to the decree can be held in contempt of court for failure to 
comply with its terms. See United States v. Armour & Co., 
402 U. S., at 676-677. Moreover, the consent decree does 
not purport to resolve any claims the Union might have 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 U. S.- (1986), § 703 of Title VII, 
see McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273 
(1976); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), or as a 
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matter of contract, see W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Work-
ers, 461 U. S. 757 (1983). Indeed, despite the efforts of the 
District Judge to persuade it to do so, the Union failed to 
raise any substantive claims. Whether it is now too la£e to 
raise suchcl3rms:--<ITif not-whether the Union's claims 
have merit are questions that must be presentedlii'tn.e first 
in~Istnct our , w ic has retained JUrisdiction 
to h~h~nly i~ before us is whether 
§ 706(g) barred the District oliit rom approviiig- tiiis con-
sen ecree. e o a It I no . ere ore, t e judg-
ment of the Court of /,pe I 
· Affirmed. 
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